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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm *for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538.*

Editors Note: Listed below are hyperlinks to the articles in this edition of the Outreach Journal. You may click on the articles which interest you, or simply scroll through the entire document as before. Thanks, Jo Ann

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GAO-01-915, September 28.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?gao-01-915

Washington Post
October 1, 2001
Pg. 1

More Terrorism Likely, U.S. Warns

Expansion Of Police Powers Is Sought

By Dana Milbank, Washington Post Staff Writer

Bush administration officials said yesterday there will likely be more terrorist strikes in the United States, possibly including chemical and biological warfare, and they urged Congress to expand police powers by Friday to counter the threat.

Despite their warnings about further attacks, top administration officials said President Bush wants to reopen Reagan National Airport and expressed confidence that new security measures would allow the reopening.

As the administration cautioned that collaborators in the Sept. 11 attacks probably were still at large, lawmakers said they had resolved most of the civil liberty objections to anti-terrorism legislation. Under a possible compromise, the government would be able to hold certain foreigners without charges for a week rather than the indefinite detention the administration sought.

Although differences narrowed over domestic anti-terrorism measures, the administration quickly rebuffed a negotiation bid from the ruling Taliban militia in Afghanistan, which said it was sheltering the man accused of masterminding the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Osama bin Laden.

Dropping claims that the regime could not locate bin Laden, the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, said bin Laden was in Afghanistan and "under our control" but "in a place which cannot be located by anyone" except top Taliban officials. Zaeef also suggested that the Taliban still might consider turning over bin Laden if the United States presented firm evidence of his guilt.

"We are thinking of negotiation," he said.

Administration officials said the Taliban had no credibility. "It was just a few days ago that they said they didn't know where he was, so I have no reason to believe anything a Taliban representative would say," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said on NBC's "Meet the Press."

Bush flew to the White House early yesterday afternoon after spending the weekend at Camp David. Though he did not speak publicly yesterday, his advisers, making the rounds of the five Sunday news shows, used the platform to

deliver Bush's messages -- among them endorsements from Rumsfeld and White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. for the reopening of National Airport with enhanced security.

"I'm confident that we can address the challenge and that Ronald Reagan Airport will be open. The question is how quickly and under what circumstances," Card said.

Two task forces studying aviation security are due to report today to Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta. Among their recommendations, according to industry officials, are that the new federal agency on aviation security that Bush announced Thursday be housed at the Transportation Department, and that the administration have flexibility to decide whether airport baggage screeners should be federal workers or contract employees.

New York officials yesterday lowered the number of missing people by more than 400 because of double-counting of foreigners, leaving 5,756 listed as dead or missing. But Bush's aides repeated earlier warnings that Americans should expect more terrorist attacks.

Speaking on CBS's "Face the Nation," Attorney General John D. Ashcroft said there is a "likelihood of additional terrorist activity."

"We think that there is a very serious threat of additional problems now," Ashcroft said. "And, frankly, as the United States responds, that threat may escalate."

Expanding on that warning, Ashcroft said on CNN's "Late Edition" that "there are all kinds of threats," including explosives. "I think there is a clear, present danger to Americans, not one that should keep us from living our lives, but one that should make us alert. . . . It's very unlikely that all of those associated with the attacks of Sept. 11 are now detained or have been detected."

Card raised the specter of biological or chemical terrorism. "I'm not trying to be an alarmist, but we know that these terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda, run by Osama bin Laden and others, have probably found the means to use biological or chemical warfare, and that is very, very bad for the world," he said on "Fox News Sunday."

Card promised that the administration would increase inventories of key vaccines and medicines. Asked whether he agreed with an assertion by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) on Saturday that the United States could use nuclear weapons to respond to a biological or chemical attack, Card said, "We're going to do everything we can to defend the United States."

Rumsfeld, asserting the "probability" that terrorists eventually would be equipped with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by nations sponsoring terrorism, said he would make "some adjustments" in the military's command structure to make room for domestic defense.

The defense secretary spoke of a campaign that would target bin Laden's al Qaeda network in 50 or 60 countries until it is "liquidated." Describing the aims of the administration's war on terrorism, he added: "We ultimately, over time, will be able to track down and make life so difficult, so uncomfortable, that people won't want to be in that business."

The American military campaign against bin Laden and his followers appeared to suffer a setback when the Saudi Arabian defense minister, Prince Sultan, told an Arabic newspaper that no troops could use his country's bases for military strikes on Arabs and Muslims. "We will not accept in our country even a single soldier who will attack Muslims or Arabs," Sultan said in an interview published yesterday in the government-controlled Okaz newspaper. The prince, however, did not explicitly rule out American use of a state-of-the-art command center southeast of Riyadh for directing military action in the region. The Pentagon has intended to coordinate much of its upcoming operations from the U.S.-built center. When asked on ABC's "This Week" about the defense minister's remarks, Saudi Ambassador to Washington Prince Bandar bin Sultan said: "Our discussion with our American friends is steady, and it is in total agreement between us and them. . . . We have not been asked for the using of the bases in Saudi Arabia."

Lawmakers, meanwhile, indicated there would be rapid action on the anti-terrorism legislation, perhaps by the Oct. 5 target the administration has set. There is wide agreement on various new provisions, including allowing investigators to see what Internet sites a suspect visited and to wiretap multiple telephones used by a suspect without obtaining a separate warrant for each phone. There will also likely be tougher penalties without statutes of limitations for terrorist offenses.

The largest remaining issue is whether foreigners who have violated immigration laws can be detained indefinitely. Senate Judiciary Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) told NBC, "We should have something in effect, like a speedy trial kind of provision, that required them to be held only a certain amount of time and then released and-or the deportation matter taken care of." Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said, "They're negotiating over seven days." The politicians also suggested that Congress might go beyond the airport security measures Bush has proposed, embracing a federal takeover of airport security.

But Ashcroft continued to argue for the power to detain suspects as long as immigration charges against them were being adjudicated. "I don't want to be releasing suspected terrorists onto the streets of the United States of America

who are being adjudicated as violators of the immigration laws already," he said. More than 500 people have been arrested or detained, many of them on immigration violations.
Staff writers Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress contributed to this report.

New York Times
October 1, 2001

Defense Secretary Warns Of Unconventional Attacks

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 — Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned today that he expected the enemies of the United States would eventually help terrorist groups obtain chemical, biological and possibly even nuclear weapons technology.

His remarks echoed other administration officials who have stepped up warnings on the spread of chemical and biological weapons, the threat of attacks against Americans overseas and the need for stronger antiterrorism measures at home.

Appearing on television, Attorney General John Ashcroft said the United States remained under threat of new attacks within its borders. Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House chief of staff, said the administration believed that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network may already have the means to use chemical and biological agents as terror weapons. On Friday, the State Department issued its latest warning of potential terrorist attacks against Americans traveling abroad.

The remarks by the three senior officials on separate programs were not based on any new intelligence, their subordinates at the Justice Department, the Pentagon and the White House said later.

President Bush and members of his cabinet have been urging Americans to resume flying, but the State Department has warned Americans traveling abroad.

"The U.S. government remains deeply concerned about the security of Americans overseas," the warning said. It said the fears were "based on threatening rhetoric from extremist groups and the potential for further terrorist actions against American citizens and interests."

Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Rumsfeld appeared to be highlighting the risks from terrorism that have prompted their departments to propose new strategies for combating terrorism. Mr. Ashcroft is pushing Congress to enact quickly a package of bills that would give the government significantly more authority to detain suspected terrorists, conduct electronic surveillance and seize assets of suspected terrorist organizations.

"We believe there are substantial risks of terrorism still in the United States of America," he said on the CNN program "Late Edition." "As we as a nation respond to what has happened to us, those risks may in fact go up."

Mr. Rumsfeld said the Pentagon believed that several nations that support international terrorists have either developed or are trying to acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and that the dissemination of those weapons seemed a realistic concern.

"It doesn't take a leap of imagination to expect that at some point those nations will work with those terrorist networks and assist them in achieving and obtaining those kinds of capabilities," Mr. Rumsfeld said.

Mr. Rumsfeld, speaking on the NBC program "Meet the Press," did not name those terrorist-supporting nations. But a Department of Defense report released in January said that Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan and Libya all have active chemical or biological weapons programs. In addition, Iraq and Iran are trying to acquire materials for nuclear devices, the report said. Those nations all are on the State Department's list of governments thought to sponsor international terrorism.

Mr. Rumsfeld is preparing to release the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, an assessment of the nation's defense needs mandated by Congress. The document, which will be sent to Congress on Monday, focuses heavily on the need to protect the United States against terrorism and ballistic missile attacks, and on the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Mr. Rumsfeld said today that the military was in the process of adjusting its command structure to deal with terrorism. "There's always been terrorism," he said, "but there's never really been worldwide terrorism at a time when the weapons have been as powerful as they are today, with chemical and biological and nuclear weapons spreading to countries that harbor terrorists."

The defense secretary's concerns were repeated by Mr. Card. "I'm not trying to be an alarmist," Mr. Card said on "Fox News Sunday," "but we know that these terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, run by Osama bin Laden and others, have probably found the means to use biological or chemical warfare."

But for all the concerns that terrorists armed with chemical or biological weapons would have for the general public, Pentagon officials say they are most immediately worried about the safety of American military forces.

Asked today whether the United States was worried that military conflict in South Asia might destabilize Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons, Mr. Rumsfeld said yes. And asked if the United States would soon turn its attention to nations other than Afghanistan that support terrorism, like Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld replied, "I think we're already turning our attention to other states."

He added, "If Al Qaeda is in 50 or 60 countries, which we know, then clearly this is not a one-country problem."

The administration's warnings about chemical and biological weapons were also picked up by Representative Henry J. Hyde, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee. On "Meet the Press," Mr. Hyde, Republican of Illinois, said biological weapons "scare" him more than nuclear weapons because they can be brought into the country "rather easily."

But on the same program, Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Delaware Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it was unlikely that terrorists had the technology to develop extremely deadly biological weapons. Terrorists might have access to weapons that use anthrax or smallpox strains, he said. "There are those serious things," he said, "but we can deal with them."

U.S. News & World Report
October 8, 2001

Washington Whispers

By Paul Bedard

Minutemen

The modern-day National Guard will return to its Revolutionary War role as Minutemen if Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gets his way. In the all-important "Quadrennial Defense Review," to be unveiled this week, Rumsfeld argues that the guard needs to be the nation's "first responders" when disaster strikes. Guard members are already getting a taste of that as they fill President Bush's request to take over airport security. Instead of battlefield duty, they would handle triage and chemical-biological defense.

Los Angeles Times
September 29, 2001
Pg. 1

Disposal Of Chemical Arms In U.S. Lags As Costs Mount

By Alan C. Miller and Myron Levin, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON - The nation's chemical weapons stockpiles, perceived as a potential security threat following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, will cost billions of dollars more and take years longer to destroy than the Army has previously told Congress and the public, according to government records and Pentagon officials.

After insisting that the Army was on schedule with the destruction of the weapons, defense officials have privately acknowledged that significant delays and dramatic overruns will raise the price of the program by about $9 billion and push its completion well past an international treaty deadline of 2007, according to an internal memo obtained by The Times.

This would come as unwelcome news to communities where the weapons are stored and where there is already uneasiness about the risk that an accident or an attack could unleash a deadly cloud of nerve or mustard agents. This last week, hundreds of Army troops were dispatched to guard the stockpiles at eight chemical weapons depots throughout the U.S. At the same time, terrorism fears could change the political dynamics of the debate over

incineration, the Army's preferred disposal method. The desire to eliminate the weapons as quickly as possible could help the Army overcome resistance to incineration in communities where that battle is being fought. The concerns could also lead to expedited environmental reviews.

The ballooning costs and timetables are likely to prompt fresh criticism of the program to eliminate the nation's 31,496 tons of chemical weapons. In recent months, members of Congress and other critics have accused top Army officials of duplicity for understating the price tag and time needed to destroy the lethal munitions.

Interviews and documents obtained by The Times show that senior officials have concluded that costs will ultimately rise to about $24 billion, up from an earlier estimate of $15 billion. Pentagon sources said the revised timetables are expected to show that work will not be completed at some of the sites until between 2008 and 2012.

The updated estimates were developed as part of a high-level Pentagon review of the weapons disposal program. A senior Pentagon official said the review has confirmed that Army officials have long realized that the projected cost of $15 billion and the 2007 deadline were far too rosy.

"People have known for a long time that wasn't going to happen," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The Army denies it provided misleading estimates.

Millions of rockets, bombs and projectiles, along with drums of nerve and blistering agents, await destruction at weapons sites in eight states. They are stored in igloo-like concrete bunkers that are covered by earthen mounds and surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards. Many were produced 50 years ago or earlier.

The Army has already destroyed more than 23% of its chemical weapons at incinerators in Tooele, Utah, and at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific.

Additional incinerators are under construction at weapons sites in Anniston, Ala., and near Umatilla, Ore. and Pine Bluff, Ark. Chemical neutralization plants are being built to destroy liquid agent stockpiles at Newport, Ind., and Aberdeen, Md. At the remaining sites--Pueblo, Colo., and Blue Grass, Ky.--a disposal method has not yet been chosen.

Program Repeatedly Came Under Fire

The overruns are the latest blow for a program that has repeatedly come under fire from government investigators, Congress and environmental groups. The $24 billion figure represents a 14-fold increase from an original estimate of $1.7 billion when the program began in 1985. At the time, the Army said it would complete destruction by 1994 of the stockpiles of mustard gas, sarin and VX nerve agent, along with rockets, land mines and other delivery systems.

An international chemical weapons treaty, ratified by the U.S. in 1997, requires that weapons stockpiles be destroyed by 2007, but provides a five-year extension for countries that cannot finish on time. Russia, which has a larger chemical weapons stockpile than the U.S., has said it will seek this additional time.

The new estimate of $24 billion was cited in a Sept. 6 memorandum by a top aide to Edward C. "Pete" Aldrich, undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics. The memo, which was obtained by The Times, summarizes the findings of a Pentagon team that completed its review of the program this summer.

The revised numbers will provide new ammunition for watchdog groups near some of the weapons sites, who say the military has used the treaty deadline and threat of leaks from aging munitions to steamroll opposition to incinerators. Some environmentalists are pushing the Army to embrace chemical neutralization as a safer alternative because incineration invariably releases traces of toxic substances into the air. And some communities--particularly Anniston, where 75,000 residents live within nine miles of a nearly finished incinerator--want more money for emergency preparedness in case of a major accident.

Pentagon officials said Friday they were not authorized to discuss the new projections until they were publicly released.

Marilyn Daughdrill, spokeswoman for the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, a branch of the Army that oversees the destruction of the weapons, said Army officials had not misled Congress or the public but had provided official estimates for costs and timetables as they were available.

One of the program's harshest detractors, Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), disagreed.

"They've made every mistake in the book: poorly run, behind schedule and deceptive on top of it," he said. The Pentagon "may need to clean that office out and start all over again."

Fears of Terrorist Use Heightened

The Sept. 11 assault has raised concerns that the chemical weapons could be targeted by terrorists seeking to steal some of the munitions or blow up them up by hitting them with a hijacked airplane.

As a precaution, the Army assigned 100 to 200 troops to each of the chemical weapons depots on Sept. 25 to reinforce already beefed-up security. They are to remain indefinitely, officials said.

Defense officials declined to discuss any impact that the heightened security concerns might have on the program.

Michael A. Burney, the executive director of the Emergency Management Agency in Calhoun County, Ala., which includes Anniston, said his office has received 60 to 70 calls daily since Sept. 11 from people asking where they can purchase gas masks and expressing other concerns.

He said he was "appalled" to learn that Anniston might have to live with the munitions beyond the 2007 treaty deadline. He said this will put an added burden on the county to prepare for a possible chemical incident over a longer period.

Even the $24 billion figure could prove optimistic. If Congress does not approve anticipated levels of funding, the final cost could go higher and the timetable could slip further, a Pentagon official said.

Efforts to reach Aldrich and James Bacon, who heads the chemical weapons disposal program, were unsuccessful. Defense officials said Friday morning they could not comment on the new projections because Aldrich had yet to approve them.

Later Friday, Henry C. Dubin, the Army's deputy assistant secretary for chemical demilitarization, said that Aldrich had signed a revised set of estimates on Sept. 26. But he said he was unable to provide them or any further information about the final projections.

The higher costs do not include the additional billions that will be needed to pinpoint and clean up more than 200 disposal sites where wastes from chemical weapons were buried decades ago. The international treaty does not cover such sites, though Army officials acknowledge the dumps must be dealt with as well.

Memo Cites Reasons Work Will Take Longer

The Sept. 6 memo does not include a new timetable, but states that after the original deadline of 2007, $6.7 billion more will be needed to finish the work. There is no date for concluding work at the Colorado and Kentucky sites, where a disposal method has not been chosen.

The memo to Aldrich cited several reasons the work will require more money and time. One is that officials have learned from experience at the existing incinerators that the rate at which the weapons can be burned is lower than expected. Other factors cited were delays in obtaining environmental permits and higher costs for labor and equipment and to contain leaks in aging stockpiles.

Some defenders of the Army say Congress is partly responsible for the delays and higher costs. Over the years, lawmakers have directed the Army to expand emergency preparedness programs and to research and develop alternate waste-destruction technologies.

The Sept. 6 memo said Defense officials are also considering a proposal to give Army contractors who operate the sites new financial incentives to beat cost and timing targets.

Although the details were not spelled out in the memo, it acknowledged such an incentives plan would be controversial. The memo noted that critics would see such incentives as an invitation to contractors to take shortcuts, but added that "a bonus would not be paid if safety or environmental performance were unsatisfactory."

The internal documents contrast with the stance taken by senior Army officials last spring when they assured Congress that the program was on track.

Appearing April 25 before a Senate panel, acting Secretary of the Army Joseph Westphal and program manager Bacon acknowledged that the Pentagon was reassessing costs and completion dates. But they said they believed the $15-billion price was in the ballpark, and that they would be able to destroy virtually all the chemical weapons by 2007.

"By 2007, actually 2006, we will meet the chemical weapons convention in destruction of all the chemical warfare material," Bacon told the panel.

Testimony Called Deliberately Misleading

Critics, led by Craig Williams of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, which opposes incineration, claimed the testimony was deliberately misleading. After Westphal and Bacon left the hearing, Williams presented lawmakers with a leaked Army report showing that, based on the Army's experience to date, incinerators couldn't process the rockets and other munitions as quickly as anticipated.

As a result, Williams testified, since at least October 2000, when the report was completed, the Army had known it would be impossible to stick to its schedule and costs.

The Army issued a statement after the hearing defending its estimates and calling William's numbers a "worst-case scenario."

The Army's Daughdrill said Friday that Westphal and Bacon "didn't have any concrete information in April that definitively said there had been any changes at that point."

But a senior defense official, in an interview with The Times, said the Army's testimony had been misleading. "It approached the level of lying to Congress," he said.

Williams said that the new internal estimates confirm that the Army knew before the April hearing "that the schedule they were presenting and the costs they were presenting were bogus. The whole thing is a shell game."

USA Today
October 1, 2001
Pg. 8

Pentagon's 'Primary Mission' Now Homeland Defense

Review identifies 'primary mission'

By Andrea Stone, USA Today

WASHINGTON — Homeland defense is now the Pentagon's "primary mission," and a military once focused on fighting overseas wars must now beef up its intelligence and surveillance efforts to fight terrorism, a major defense review is expected to report today.

The nation's new military strategy "restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States, its air and sea approaches," a draft of the quadrennial review says. At the same time, it assures friends and allies that "the United States will not retreat from the world."

The document, to be released at the Pentagon today, is the result of three months of closed-door meetings by uniformed and civilian officials. Analysts say its main points — including the importance of intelligence, space, information warfare, long-range precision-guided weapons and missile defense — remain unchanged.

But the language and emphasis in this blueprint for the military reflects new realities since the attacks. The draft says, "Contending with uncertainty must be a centerpiece of U.S. defense planning." The military must "be able to adapt to surprise when it occurs," the draft review says

Defending U.S. territory has long been a key issue for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. But it is now "the core of national strategy," says Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute. "The events of Sept. 11 have validated the administration's priorities."

The report emphasizes the military's role in homeland defense. It says the Pentagon "must be capable of providing civil support" to other federal agencies. The document also reiterates warnings that future attacks could include "more destructive chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive weapons." It speaks of the need to "isolate the most immediate threats, such as global terrorist networks."

The document says that the terrorist attacks preclude any "substantial reductions in forces." Talk of reducing the current level of 1.4 million troops or cuts in the Navy's 12 aircraft carrier battle groups are off the table for now.

Other review highlights:

*Instead of preparing to fight two wars simultaneously in the Persian Gulf and the Korean peninsula, the Pentagon will focus "more on how an adversary might fight than on who the adversary might be and where a war might occur."

*Concentrating U.S. forces in Western Europe is "inadequate" in the post-Cold War world, and a "reorientation" of overseas troops should be undertaken to increase their presence in the vast Pacific.

USA Today
October 1, 2001
Pg. 2

Guard Units On Duty At Airports

Call-up will supplement security for up to 6 months

By Fred Bayles, USA Today

When Herb Twiss first saw National Guardsmen armed with automatic weapons at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, his first reaction was one of relief. "I thought, 'Great. The government's securing the airports,' " says the Milwaukee businessman. "But after a time, it was also a reminder of how unsecure travel really is these days." Air travelers around the country are getting their first taste of another new facet of life in the wake of the terrorist attacks as Guard members begin taking posts at some of the nation's airports.

Their limited presence follows last week's request by President Bush that governors call up 4,000 to 5,000 troops to supplement security at the nation's 420 commercial airports for up to 6 months.

By Sunday afternoon, Guard members were on duty at a few airports in states including Tennessee, Nebraska, North Dakota, Colorado, Oregon, Georgia and New Mexico. Most go on duty later this week after they complete security training.

Officials from the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Guard say training should take 1 to 4 days. The training includes instruction on operating X-ray scanners and metal detectors, surveillance, safe handling of dangerous items, incident management and conflict resolution.

In many states, officials plan to call up Guard members who also have police authorization, which will allow them to make arrests and detain suspects.

The Guardsmen are intended to back up FAA, law enforcement and airport security officers. But the heightened sense of security they offer to passengers may be just as important.

"It is an image type of thing," says Brig. Gen. Chuck Fleming of the Illinois National Guard. "My MPs are very professional. ... Their presence will have a calming type of effect." Fleming expects about 150 of the state's guardsmen to be on duty at 12 airports by the end of the week, with a heavy presence at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. Training begins today at the Bloomington, Ill., armory.

In California, Gov. Gray Davis plans to station as many as 1,000 guardsmen at the state's 31 airports. "Your mission will be to enhance passenger safety at airports, not to substitute but to increase security through your presence," Davis told 50 Guard members at a reserve center Friday.

Oregon officials have decided their guardsmen will carry no weapons. And Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee is waiting for the FAA to provide the necessary training before he activates Guard members. "There's no need to activate now and pay them just to sit around waiting to be trained," said Jim Harris, a spokesman for Huckabee.

Rhode Island's Lincoln Almond was the only governor last week to refuse Bush's request. He said he was satisfied with security at the state's airport. Almond changed his mind over the weekend when he learned that federal funding will pay for guardsmen throughout T.F. Green Airport, the regional facility just south of Providence, and not just at security checkpoints.

State officials in New York, where about 4,500 guardsmen have already seen duty in New York City's recovery efforts, said planning for a Guard presence at state airports will take a while because of the strain on resources. "We'll be announcing a plan within the next several days," said Scott Sandman, spokesman for the state Division of Military and Naval Affairs.

Guard units have already been busy in several states, providing patrols at bridges, water reservoirs and other security-sensitive spots. Others have been called up to provide airborne security over the USA and to supplement military forces overseas in the event of a strike against terrorists in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

For many air travelers in this country, the new military presence underscores how much has changed in the past 3 weeks.

"If you've got an armed threat, you need an armed presence," says Owen Kearns, a Bakersfield, Calif., businessman who travels once a week. "I'm not sure what the Guard adds to security, but at least helps the police, and it boosts the morale at airports."

Contributing: Wire reports

New York Times
October 1, 2001

Bush Chooses Retired General As His National Counterterrorism Coordinator

By Elizabeth Becker

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 — President Bush has selected a retired Army general to become his chief aide for counterterrorism, completing the selection of his new top homeland security team.

The appointee, Wayne A. Downing, is a retired four-star Army general who headed the 1996 inquiry into a bomb attack that killed 19 airmen in Saudi Arabia. He will become the president's national coordinator on counterterrorism, an administration official said.

A specialist in counterterrorism, General Downing was selected for the new position because of his reputation as a skilled and brutally honest expert, the official said.

In his report on the bombing of the Khobar Towers Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, General Downing blamed the military leadership, a finding that led to the resignation of the one-star general in charge. He also warned that terrorism was a permanent threat and the government needed a strategy to fight this "undeclared war."

A former head of the military's Special Operations Command, General Downing had authorized using AC-130 gunships to aid the Army raid in Somalia in 1993. He was overruled by his superiors, and 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded.

General Downing will join the National Security Council, replacing Richard A. Clarke, the counterterrorism czar at the White House. He will be given broad powers over the annual $10.8 billion counterintelligence effort, including the use of defense and diplomacy to shape counterterrorism plans, according to a senior administration official. The official said the general's mission would be to address "the whole question of counterterrorism and how we try to head off and defeat the threat before they're ever successful here at home."

Last week the president selected Mr. Clarke to become the director of a new Office of Cyber Security within the security council. Mr. Clarke will be charged with protecting the nation's telecommunications and information technology infrastructure against a terrorist attack.

Heading the entire enterprise is Gov. Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania, who will become the first Homeland Security adviser. The administration has said Mr. Ridge will head a new Homeland Security Council with powers matching that of the National Security Council, created in 1947 to fight the emerging cold war.

The homeland council will include the attorney general; the defense, treasury, health and human services and agriculture secretaries; and the directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

For his part, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell will name Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, a retired marine and a former chief of the Central Command, to become his adviser for the diplomatic effort against terrorism, according to an official.

While members of Congress have praised the president's new homeland initiative, they have also voiced concern that the new agency lacks the power to pull together the elements of the 46 departments and agencies that now have roles in the defense against terrorist attacks.

A close ally of the president, Mr. Ridge will have the power to coordinate these federal agencies at the highest level and authority over their budgets. He will be sworn in on Oct. 8, and only then will the selections of Mr. Clarke and General Downing become official.

Defense Week
October 1, 2001
Pg. 1

Taliban Stocked Chemical Weapons, Diplomat Says

By Mohammed Ahmedullah

NEW DELHI—The Taliban government of Afghanistan may have stored chemical weapons in caves near Kandahar in the southern part of the country, according to a representative of the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan’s opposition movement.

"We don’t know their composition or the extent of the arsenal," said Sardar Ahmedia, the charge d’affairs of the Embassy of the Afghanistan Northern Alliance here. "But we know for sure they are stored there, because ordinary Afghans were employed in the storage and handling."

The ordinary Afghans "were told [that] what they were handling were ‘special weapons,’ and [the people were] given gas masks and protective suits for the purpose," he said in an interview. "This was about two years ago." The Northern Alliance diplomat’s statements may not be objective, inasmuch as he was describing his enemy, the Taliban movement that rules most of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, if the Taliban indeed does possess operational chemical weapons, it could complicate any U.S. and allied incursion into Afghanistan to find terrorist Osama bin Laden or exact a price from the Taliban for harboring him the last few years.

There has been little public discussion of the Taliban’s possible possession of weapons of mass destruction. Recent press reports have indicated that bin Laden—the Taliban’s guest and the main suspect in the Sept. 11 terror attacks on America—has sought and may possess such weapons.

The Washington Times reported last week that Russian mafia officials may have helped bin Laden get hold of chemical arms. But no hard evidence has publically surfaced that either the Taliban or bin Laden has an operational capability. The Times said classified analysis of the types of chemicals and toxins sought by al Qaeda indicate the group probably is trying to produce the nerve agent Sarin or biological weapons made up of anthrax spores.
An FBI court document made public in 1998 in New York stated that Osama bin Laden's organization, al Qaeda, tried to purchase enriched uranium since 1993 "for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons." The State Department's latest report on international terrorism says that al Qaeda "continued" to seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities.

'Ultimate ticket to heaven'

Addressing the overall conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Ahmedia said that, in the past week, Taliban fighters had withdrawn in large numbers towards Kabul and Kandahar, leaving only a token presence in forward posts. As a result, he said, the Northern Alliance has made substantial military gains.
"We are now 25 percent in control of Afghanistan," he said. By contrast, most reports credit the alliance with controlling 10 percent or less of the territory. He added that "in many towns and villages we encountered little or no resistance."
In addition, he said, the Taliban militia is believed to be preparing suicide bombers—both men and women—to fight U.S. soldiers should they set foot on Afghanistan. They may also threaten U.S. troops in adjoining nations. The Taliban militia has a cadre of 10,000 in its fidayeen, or suicide squad, who have taken bayath—a sacred oath to be sacrificed in the cause of Jihad, or holy war, he said.

Mullah's MIGs

Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar called a meeting of the fidayeen in Kandahar last week and ordered them to be ready to be martyred in the cause of Islam, Ahmedia told Defense Week. Northern Alliance sources in Kandahar say the fidayeen are being put through their paces in the art of deception and suicide bombing, he said. This deadly force was planned to be unleashed against visible American targets like makeshift air bases and supply depots, perhaps in Tajikistan or Pakistan.
Mullah Omar has already declared that countries that allow U.S. forces to operate from their soil would be treated as enemies. Another threat could come from the old MiG-21 fighters and other planes in control of the Taliban. These could not only perform traditional fighter functions but could also be loaded with explosives and flown into U.S. Army encampments, he said. Similarly, tanks and trucks could be booby-trapped and driven into U.S. Army convoys. Taliban soldiers captured by the Northern Alliance in fighting after Sept. 11 appeared supremely confident that they could handle U.S. soldiers.
Ahmedia said "the Taliban indoctrination system was such that death of their cadres is glorified and killing the enemy and losing one's life in the process is considered the ultimate ticket to heaven. Photographs of martyrs are pasted in mosques and recruits told to model their lives on them."
The women's wing of the Taliban is called dokhtar-aane-millat—or daughters of the faith. While little has been heard of them in Afghanistan, they have been quite active in Kashmir, organizing pro-independence rallies and endorsing calls for women to wear veils and stay indoors. A senior fellow at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis in Delhi named Sreedhar said he would be very surprised if women were used as suicide bombers.
"The dokhtar-aane-millat has been active in Kashmir, yes, but not as suicide bombers," he said. "Given the male chauvinist attitude of the Taliban, it would be surprising if they were to be used even as guards."
However, Najum Mushtaq, an independent analyst from Islamabad, said the Taliban had women fighters in the early days before the group gained nearly complete control over Afghanistan and imposed its now infamous restrictions on women.
"But they have demonstrated that they are capable of anything," he said. "You could have a veiled woman walking towards an army post and blow herself up when she got close enough."

New York Times
October 1, 2001

U.S. And Pakistan Discuss Nuclear Security

By Douglas Frantz

QUETTA, Pakistan, Sept. 30 — American military and intelligence officials have talked with the Pakistani government about concerns over the security of its nuclear weapons stockpile and the country's two nuclear plants, two Pakistani officials say.

The American delegation in the capital, Islamabad, had preliminary talks with Pakistani officials last week about improving security and installing new safeguards on its nuclear weapons and at its nuclear power plants, said the Pakistani officials, who were briefed on the talks.

But there are some formal limitations on how much assistance the United States can provide because Pakistan has refused to sign the treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Also, American law imposes restrictions on sharing information about nuclear weapons with other countries.

Experts predict that the United States will now find ways around these hurdles, and would eventually assist the Pakistanis in improving surveillance at sensitive sites, sharing technology for devices to disable weapons and advising Pakistan on methods for evaluating the reliability of crucial personnel and security in the event that weapons must be transported.

The Americans could offer classified information, like data on creating disabling devices in case a weapon is stolen, though there are tight restrictions on that data too, said nuclear experts outside both governments.

The focus of the discussions last week was on how to protect weapons and create a new layer of restrictions on personnel handling them. The fear is that if there is a sustained Western attack on Afghanistan, unrest could boil over in Pakistan. Those strains would be reflected in the Pakistan Army, experts say, and there is a threat that Afghan-sympathizers in the military might seize control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the president of Pakistan, said today that he was confident the country's nuclear weapons were secure and that there was no risk of them falling into the wrong hands.

"The army is certainly the most disciplined army in the world, and there is no chance of any extremism coming into the army," General Pervez said in an interview with CNN. "I don't see this doomsday scenario ever appearing."

Brig. Gen. Kevin Chilton of the Air Force led the delegation, which included representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. They held three days of talks before leaving on Thursday for the United States. A spokesman for the American Embassy in Islamabad refused to comment on any aspect of the delegation's visit.

Within days of the attacks on America, Pakistani officials in Washington discussed nuclear safeguards with Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, according to the Pakistani officials.

Last week's talks in Islamabad were dominated by concerns about the conflict within Pakistan's military government over its decision to cooperate in the war on terrorism. Elements of the army's officer corps and rank and file are sympathetic to the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan, though there have been no suggestions of a mutiny.

"I see no divisions which should be a cause of any serious alarm," Gen. Talat Masood, retired, said in an interview. "The one possibility is that if the war becomes protracted and if there are a lot of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, it could arouse passions among the civilians and give rise to differences within the military."

Pakistan also has worries about potential attacks on its two nuclear power plants. Security was increased at its nuclear centers within hours of the attacks in the United States. But possible divisions within the army appear to pose the gravest danger.

"The greatest risk is a fissure within Pakistan's military caused by officers sympathetic to the Taliban," Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, said in a telephone interview.

Michael Krepon, a nuclear weapons specialist at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, agreed that the potential for unrest creates pressing concerns. "Such officers getting out of control would be the ultimate nightmare," he said.

"In peacetime, we would have high confidence in the capacity of the military to protect the weapons," he said in a telephone interview. "The question becomes what happens when you are not in a peace time situation and the great strains placed on the country are reflected in the military."

Talks with Pakistan about the military aspects of its nuclear program reflect a reversal by the American government. The Clinton administration imposed tough sanctions on Pakistan after it conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998 in response to nuclear tests by India, raising tensions in the region.

The Bush administration is easing those sanctions and other restrictions in response to Pakistan's pledge of assistance and the sharing of intelligence on neighboring Afghanistan.

Pakistan's nuclear power plants include a small Canadian-built one in Karachi and a newer one built by the Chinese in Chashma, southwest of Islamabad. Both plants were built to Western standards with the advice of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Officials with the agency said they have conducted talks with Pakistan about security at its power plants since Sept. 11. But the agency is prohibited from discussing the weapons matters because Pakistan has not signed the treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan operates research reactors in its capital, Islamabad, and Khushab, which is southeast of the city. American officials have said the reactor at Khushab mostly produces plutonium for weapons and can generate enough plutonium for one atomic bomb a year.

In addition, the Center for Defense Information in Washington estimates that Pakistan already has enough highly enriched uranium for 23 to 29 nuclear weapons.

Mr. Krepon, the nuclear weapons specialist, said the administration will likely determine how far it wants to go in helping Pakistan and then find ways to provide that assistance within the boundaries of the treaty limiting the spread of those weapons, which the United States supports.

He said that the trickiest topic would probably be how to make devices that disable a bomb if it is stolen. The United States has sophisticated disabling devices, but Mr. Krepon said legal restrictions made it hard to share the information.

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Pg. 34

Handbook For The New War

This battle won't be quick. From spies to Special Forces, nation-building to high tech, how America should be fighting this conflict against terror

By Evan Thomas

The evidence against Lotfi Raissi seemed pretty damning. The Algerian pilot had allegedly given flying instructions to four of the suspected hijackers in the suicide attacks on New York and Washington. Raissi swore that he was totally innocent, but investigators had video pictures of the man with the hijackers, as well as correspondence and phone records. Yet a few days after Raissi's arrest at his home near London's Heathrow Airport in the wake of the Sept. 11 atrocity, Britain's Scotland Yard was about to let the man go. It seems that British law does not allow the authorities to hold a man in custody merely because American law enforcement believes he might be a material witness to a crime committed in the United States. American investigators had to scramble to contrive a charge against Raissi. The crime? On his application for a pilot's license, Raissi allegedly failed to disclose a minor arrest for theft and an old knee injury.

So, with creaks and groans, do the wheels of justice grind on to fight the crime of the new century. Many frightened Americans would like to hunt down and kill any terrorists—along with their aiders and abettors—as quickly as possible, and worry about civil liberties later. But the fact is that several centuries of the rule of law, as well as long-standing bureaucratic and national rivalries, guarantee that the shadow war against terrorism will be groping, erratic and frustrating. Whether it will be successful ultimately depends on cooperation between spies, both at home and abroad. Trust is not a quality generally associated with espionage. But in its battle against a threat that seems at once global, seamless and suicidal, the American intelligence community is going to need extraordinary cooperation from a patchwork of foreign security services that sometimes seem more devoted to stonewalling or subverting each other than to engaging a common enemy.

First, American intelligence services will have to stop fighting each other. The CIA, which spies abroad, and the FBI, which chases criminals at home and abroad, have only recently begun cooperating better, and their cultures still clash. The United States is combating terrorism with a rickety structure built a half century ago to contain global communism. Generally speaking, the FBI has been better at solving crimes than preventing them. The gumshoes are dogged about dragnets (almost 500 people have been arrested so far in the hijacking investigation). But their intelligence analysts, hobbled by aging computers, are not highly esteemed by the rest of the intelligence community. "The FBI thinks that Islamic terrorists are organized just like the Mafia," says a former high-ranking CIA official. "They pull out their wiring diagram for the Gambino family and substitute the name Al Qaeda." The FBI is notorious for not sharing information with other agencies, while hogging any credit. (Insiders' joke: dogs from the FBI, the DEA, Customs and the Department of Agriculture are sent to sniff a mysterious package. The

DEA dog finds drugs, the Customs dog finds money and the Agriculture Department dog finds diseased meat. The FBI dog snorts the drugs, buries the money, eats the meat—and issues a press release.)

President George W. Bush has appointed a special assistant for Homeland Security, Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge, to make the agencies work together. But unless Ridge is given control over budgets and hiring and firing—highly unlikely—bureaucratic rivalries will continue to undercut investigations and intelligence gathering.

Battered by scandals, the CIA has been struggling with low morale. Former CIA officials and case officers are very doubtful about the agency's ability to penetrate the terror cells of Islamic extremists. "The Company" has fewer Arab-speaking case officers and less regional expertise than it did during the cold war. The agency's best assets have always been "walk-ins," disaffected foreign nationals who offer to spy against their own country. "You don't get walk-ins from terror cells," says a former case officer. The agency did once get a walk-in who was a Libyan intelligence officer. But the turncoat neglected to tell the CIA about a Libyan plot to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 until after the jetliner exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. (The man, Abdul Majid Giaka, became talkative only when the agency threatened to drop him from the payroll.) Giaka was supposed to be a key prosecution witness against one of the two alleged Pan Am 103 bombers—but was so discredited as a liar that the accused terrorist got off. A retired CIA case officer with deep experience in the Middle East estimated that it would take the agency six years to build an intelligence service capable of "seeding" agents into the radical Islamic underworld.

That's much too long for a population worried that the next terrorist strike will be a biochem or even nuclear attack. Americans may begin to feel more like Israelis, who regard terrorism as a ticking bomb. The Israeli approach is direct: kill or be killed. After the "Black September" movement slaughtered Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics, Israel's Mossad tracked down and killed the terrorists, one by one (as well as an innocent Moroccan waiter in Norway who was snuffed by mistake). But retaliation has hardly stopped suicide bombers from striking Israel.

The Mossad has a wary relationship with U.S. intelligence, which has accused Israel of spying on the United States. A better bet to help America roll up(and knock off) terror cells may be Egyptian and Saudi intelligence. The Egyptians are ruthless. "They play the old-fashioned game," says an ex-CIA case officer. "They not only round up individuals but the entire family to have, how you say, an arduous conversation." Egypt may have been too effective rooting out Islamic extremists: many of them fled elsewhere, including to America, in order to re-form their cells. The Saudis have probably done more to penetrate Al Qaeda than any other foreign intelligence service, but Al Qaeda in turn has penetrated the Saudi regime.

Two interrelated global charities directly financed by the Saudi government—the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Muslim World League —have been used by bin Laden to finance his operations. The organizations were left off the list of groups sanctioned by the United States last week, U.S. officials hinted to NEWSWEEK, in order to avoid embarrassing the Saudi government. Judging whether Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, is friend or foe can be equally dicey. The ISI has helped the CIA hunt bin Laden, but it also trained Taliban soldiers (including, probably, some of bin Laden's) at camps in Afghanistan. Among the charitable organizations originally listed as a bin Laden front was the Rabita Trust for the Rehabilitation of Stranded Pakistanis. One small problem: the president of Pakistan, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was on Rabita's board. Intelligence officials tell NEWSWEEK that Washington gave Musharraf 36 hours to quit, but when he didn't, the Rabita Trust was quietly dropped from the list.

Some Middle Eastern intelligence services are more reliably trustworthy. Jordan methodically thwarted an Al Qaeda plot to attack some local resorts frequented by Westerners at the time of the 2000 millennium. Jordan's King Abdullah has stuck his neck out for Bush (Abdullah's late father, King Hussein, was on the CIA payroll for two decades). Likewise, the Filipinos have foiled a number of plots aimed at Westerners in the Far East. In 1995 Abdul Hakim Murad was arrested for planning to kill the pope and blow up 11 American airliners. Eager to learn more, the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group beat Murad, forced water into his mouth, crushed lighted cigarettes into his private parts, made him sit on ice cubes, threatened to rape him and told him that he'd never see the light of day in Manila. (Murad did not spill, however, until the Filipinos threatened to turn him over to Israel's Mossad for further interrogation.)

The CIA does not torture, "but we've always worked with agencies that do do that," says a former U.S. defense-intelligence operative. "Our policy is: don't do it, don't tolerate it, argue against it and, by God, don't be there when it happens. But if someone comes to you with information, you don't ask, 'Was the guy treated well?' You ask about the reliability of the information."

No one has been more skillful at looking the other way over the years than British intelligence. The Brits have been America's closest ally in spying as well as everything else. But British intelligence has incurred the wrath of other services by tolerating—some would say protecting—some pret- ty questionable characters in its midst. French counterterror officials sneer about "Londonistan" because the British cite their scrupulous adherence to human rights and the rule of law as an excuse not to arrest several figures widely regarded as bin Laden lieutenants. The French

want to get custody of Sheik Abu Hamza, "The One-Armed Man," who has a claw for a hand (lost to a mine in Afghanistan). The British insist that Sheik Abu is a harmless blowhard. The sheik, who preaches at the Finsbury Park Mosque in north London, is allegedly a bin Laden associate linked to a terrorist attack before a G7 ministers' meeting in Lille, France, in 1996. The French suspect that Britain is either buying protection from Sheik Abu or using him as a double agent.

So it goes in the wilderness of mirrors, the spy vs. spy world that was murky enough in the cold war and is practically opaque in the New War of Terror. "The intelligence effort will be a 5,000-piece jigsaw puzzle," said a veteran American intelligence officer. "And all the pieces are pure black." While Bush has demanded that each nation choose sides in the struggle ahead, intelligence veterans know better. In the real war against terrorism, alliances will be vague and shifting, deceit and revenge the norm. Defeating the terrorists is unlikely. Disrupting them is more achievable, but only by working closely with foreign intelligence services while winking at their methods.

With Christopher Dickey in Paris, Melinda Liu in Hong Kong, Mark Hosenball in Washington, Dan Ephron in Jerusalem, Joshua Hammer in Islamabad, Stryker McGuire in London and Alan Zarembo in Cairo

New York Times
September 30, 2001

Some See U.S. As Vulnerable In Germ Attack

By Sheryl Gay Stolberg

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 — The United States is inadequately prepared to confront bioterrorist attacks, according to a broad range of health experts and officials. The nation must develop new vaccines and treatments, they say, but it must also fortify its fragile public health infrastructure, the first line of defense in detecting and containing biological threats.

Bioterrorism — the intentional release of potentially lethal viruses or bacteria into the air, food or water supply — poses daunting technical challenges, and experts say it would be difficult to carry out a successful attack. Still, many believe it is inevitable that someone will eventually try it in the United States.

In the weeks since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, much of the discussion about bioterrorism has centered on a shortage of antibiotics and vaccines. But the bigger problem, officials agree, is a lack of basic public health infrastructure and preparedness that could thwart a terror attack or limit its effects.

Doctors are poorly trained to recognize symptoms of infection with possible biological weapons, like plague and anthrax, which can resemble the flu. Many of the nation's hospitals lack necessary equipment — in some cases even simple tools like fax machines — to receive or report information in an emergency. Though a number of federal agencies have established bioterrorism response teams and procedures, and there has been steady improvement in laboratory facilities around the country to test and identify biological agents, the result is a patchwork, set against a larger patchwork of cities, counties and states with their own reporting requirements and plans.

"For bioterrorism, the No. 1 inadequacy, if you had to rank them, is the inadequacy of our public health infrastructure," said Senator Bill Frist, Republican of Tennessee. "That is a product of about 15 years of neglect."

In a report issued last week, the General Accounting Office said the government's bioterrorism planning was so disjointed that the agencies involved could not even agree on which biological agents posed the biggest threat. Officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, consider smallpox a major risk. But the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not even put smallpox on its list.

At the same time, there are holes in the federal bureaucracy, where two important health positions remain unfilled: commissioner of food and drugs and director of the National Institutes of Health. The Food and Drug Administration will play a crucial role in the development of vaccines or treatments for use in the event of a biological attack, but President Bush and Congress — in particular Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts — have been unable to agree on an acceptable nominee.

Federal officials got a taste of how complicated, and chilling, a bioterrorist attack could be during a war game played at Andrews Air Force base, outside Washington, in June. The exercise, code-named Dark Winter, began with a report of a single case of smallpox in Oklahoma City. By the time it was over, the imaginary epidemic had spread to 25 states and killed several million people. As it unfolded, growing grimmer and grimmer, the government

quickly ran out of vaccine, forcing officials to make life-and-death decisions about who would be protected — health workers? soldiers? — and whether the military would have to be brought in to quarantine patients.
"Dark Winter showed just how unprepared we are to deal with bioterrorism," said Jerome M. Hauer, the former head of emergency management in New York City and now a bioterrorism consultant to Tommy G. Thompson, the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. "It pointed out that there were significant challenges to all levels of government."
To meet those challenges, Senators Kennedy and Frist are urging President Bush to spend at least $1 billion on a range of measures that, they say, will improve the ability of health officials to combat bioterrorism. In an interview, Mr. Thompson agreed that improvements were needed, although he said the government was prepared to handle an attack right now.
"I would like to expand our pharmaceutical supplies," Mr. Thompson said. "I would like to strengthen the public health system. I would like to get some more inspectors for the food supply. I would like to expand security in our laboratories. I would like to purchase more vaccine."
For years, federal officials considered the threat of bioterrorism to be negligible. But concern began to mount in 1995, after a Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, launched nerve gas attacks in the Tokyo subways. In the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, some members of the public have developed intense fears of germ warfare, and are trying to stock up on their own supplies.
"We have people buying gas masks and antibiotics when that is not going to provide real protection," said Stephen S. Morse, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness at Columbia University.
Mr. Thompson said the administration was "very confident that we could act and react to any kind of bioterrorist breakout." But while Dr. Morse and other public health experts say the nation is better prepared than it was even three or four years ago, they do not share that confidence.
For instance, the United States has only 7 to 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine on hand — estimates vary — while experts estimate that at least 40 million would be needed to combat a serious epidemic. Under a government contract, a company in Cambridge, Mass., is testing a new vaccine, but it will not be available until 2004 at the earliest.
But perhaps the most pressing need, many health experts say, is improving the nation's ability to recognize when a biological attack is under way.
"We are not going to have a bomb fly out of the sky and land on somebody so that we can say, `Look, there's a bomb, and we are all dying of anthrax,' " said Asha M. George, who studies biological warfare for the Nunn-Turner Initiative, a nonprofit foundation in Washington. "It is most likely going to be a covert release, and people will get sick and go to their hospitals, and the public health system will have to pick up on this."
In some ways, the Sept. 11 attack on the World Trade Center was a test of that system.
Minutes after two jets slammed into the World Trade Center, the National Guard was mobilized. The Guard has created 29 teams around the nation to aid the response to chemical, biological and radiological attacks; on Sept. 11, a 22-member unit was ordered into Manhattan to test the air for deadly germs or chemical toxins. None were found.
Soon afterward, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the branch of the health and human services agency that coordinates bioterrorism preparedness, alerted state and local health departments to look for signs of unusual illnesses that might be the result of a biological or chemical attack. That alert remains in effect; so far, nothing out of the ordinary has been reported.
At the same time, officers from the centers' Epidemic Intelligence Service were stationed at 15 sentinel, or warning, hospitals scattered in New York City's five boroughs, also looking for strange symptoms. And for the first time, drugs and other medical supplies were dispatched from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which is maintained by the disease control centers to respond to a germ outbreak.
"You could see how orderly we are right now in responding to the terrorist attack on the 11th," Mr. Thompson said. "And we would do the same thing with a bioterrorist attack."
But in many respects, Sept. 11 was not a true test. There were no biological or chemical agents to detect. Because there were far fewer people injured than officials had originally expected, the epidemic intelligence officers were working in relatively calm hospital surroundings, as opposed to crowded emergency rooms. The drugs and medical supplies went largely unused.
So while Mr. Thompson insists the government "can handle any contingency right now," there is no way to know if the response would have been adequate during an actual bioterrorism attack, according to one expert closely involved in the government's antiterror planning who spoke on condition of anonymity.
For one thing, the expert said, in the New York City attacks doctors, nurses and other health care workers stayed at their jobs. But in the event of a biological attack, many might go home to their own families.

Moreover, with managed care's pressure to eliminate hospital beds and increase efficiency, hospitals have lost their so-called surge capacity — the ability to accommodate a sudden increase of patients. And doctors are not trained to recognize the symptoms of germ warfare.

"When you don't see very uncommon things, you don't think about very uncommon things," said Nicole Lurie, a former federal health official who worked on bioterrorism issues in the Clinton administration. "I saw three people in the morning yesterday with acute respiratory illness. They all had the same symptoms. Should I think this is bioterrorism?"

A big part of the government's formidable challenge is simply coordinating its response; across Washington, a range of bureaucracies, including the departments of energy, defense and justice and the health and human services agency, are busy planning for bioterrorist attacks. That job will soon fall to Tom Ridge, the governor of Pennsylvania, whom President Bush named to head a new Office of Homeland Security.

Some experts outside government say Secretary Thompson has already taken a step in the right direction by creating a position coordinating a departmentwide initiative against bioterrorism. In July, nearly two months before the World Trade Center attacks, Mr. Thompson named Scott Lillibridge, the disease control center's top expert in bioterrorism, to fill the job.

So, despite their worries, many experts agree that the groundwork has been laid for improvements.

"Are we prepared to prevent it? No," Dr. Lurie said. "Are we prepared to respond to it? It depends on what form it takes. I would say that we are a whole lot further along than we were three or four years ago."

Mr. Hauer agreed. "A lot of what we need to do is being done," he said. "The problem is, some of these steps take time."

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Pg. 12

Biological, Chemical Threat Is Termed Tricky, Complex

Smallpox Virus Is Most Feared in Array of Deadly Weapons

By David Brown, Washington Post Staff Writer

As weapons of terror, anthrax spores would be the easiest to handle. The smallpox virus would be the least accessible, but the most feared. Ounce for ounce, botulinum toxin is the deadliest. Chemical nerve agents, however, are the only ones that have ever actually killed people.

Experts on the subject cannot say with any confidence what the United States should expect if terrorists turn to chemical or biological weapons as their next instruments of attack. Among the germs, toxins and compounds commonly mentioned, there's no clear front-runner.

Each agent offers a complicated mix of accessibility, difficulty of production and delivery, and lethality. A terrorist's goal -- mass death or merely mass panic -- is also a crucial variable that is hard to predict.

"I think it's just guesswork. . . . It's not ignorable is the most that one can say," said Alan P. Zelicoff, a physician and biological weapons expert at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico.

Chemical weapons -- in particular nerve agents -- could cause mass death if distributed by airplane in particular settings, such as over a sports stadium. However, it would be hard for a terrorist group to make or acquire the amount of chemicals necessary for an attack of that size.

Much smaller quantities of biological agents -- either microbe or toxin -- are needed to kill large numbers of people. But while it might be feasible for terrorists to get or produce those materials, delivering them is extremely difficult. It requires expertise, special equipment and practice -- all of which is hard to conceal. (The smallpox virus is an exception to this generality.)

For a chemical or biological attack with mass casualties, "you have to have a state or the equivalent," said C.J. Peters, a medical virologist at the University of Texas at Galveston and former head of the special pathogens branch of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

"I don't think the garden-variety terrorist is going to do anything," Peters said. "But take some group that has a lot of money and put them in a country that's full of terrorists and it's another matter."

However, evidence that it is possible to amass the material and know-how *without* a government's assistance exists in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic cult that conducted several acts of terror in Japan in the 1990s.

Aum Shinrikyo, which had about 40,000 members worldwide, operated a three-story chemical factory in Japan. Over a two-year period, it produced 65 pounds of sarin, a liquid nerve agent compounded from several dangerous and highly corrosive starting materials. The poison was then tested on sheep on a ranch in western Australia. The cult also produced some amounts of botulinum toxin and the bacterium that causes anthrax.

Aum Shinrikyo's experience, however, demonstrates that access to the raw materials does not ensure successful attacks. From 1990 to 1993, cult members released the botulinum toxin five times and anthrax spores four times, causing no casualties. The organization's most notorious terrorist act -- the release of sarin in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995 -- killed only 12 people, although it injured more than 1,000 and caused panic.

"I'm skeptical of high-tech scenarios for chemical or biological attack," said Jonathan B. Tucker, an expert on chemical and biological terrorism in the Washington office of the California-based Monterey Institute. An act of industrial sabotage at a chemical plant or the contamination of food in a few places is more likely, he said.

The only modern example of biological terror in the United States occurred in 1984 when a religious group called the Rajneeshees put salmonella bacteria in salad bars and coffee creamers in 10 restaurants in Oregon. This caused 751 cases of illness but no deaths.

There's universal agreement that the smallpox virus is the single most dangerous raw material for a non-nuclear terror attack. "If you look at all the bioterrorist agents, you can break them down into smallpox and everything else," Peters said.

Smallpox spreads easily from person to person and can kill up to a third of those infected; and virtually everyone on Earth is vulnerable. It is the only eradicated human infection. The last case occurred in 1978, and routine immunization has not been done for more than two decades. People who got single vaccinations as children are unlikely to still have immunity. There is no good treatment for it, and not enough vaccine exists to immunize large populations.

Starting next week, the World Health Organization will review at least two models of a hypothetical smallpox release to determine how many doses of vaccine might be needed to contain an outbreak, said David L. Heymann, director of communicable diseases at WHO headquarters in Geneva. He said he has heard that several countries are interested in acquiring stocks or restarting vaccine production.

(The U.S. government has 15.4 million doses of smallpox vaccine and has ordered 40 million more for delivery by the end of 2004. The Department of Health and Human Services will try to speed up production and delivery, an official said last week.)

The smallpox virus is known to exist in only two places: freezers at the CDC in Atlanta and at a facility in Koltsovo, Russia. Whether any person, institution or country violated WHO's call in the early 1980s to destroy or transfer samples to those two repositories is unknown.

Many experts believe there is a chance a small number of countries -- including Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq and Syria -- retain samples of the smallpox virus. As recently as 1990, the Soviet Union produced it in large quantities as part of a bioweapons program in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention that the country had signed in 1972.

Among more accessible microbes, the anthrax bacterium "would be the most likely" to be used as a biological weapon, said Kenneth W. Bernard, a U.S. Public Health Service physician who was previously on the National Security Council staff and who is now an adviser to Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.)

"It's a relatively stable bacterium, you can find it in the wild and it has been weaponised by a large number of countries, so the technology for doing so is out there," he said.

Primarily a disease of livestock, anthrax can cause fatal illness in human beings, especially when the causative microbe, *Bacillus anthracis*, is inhaled. Its advantage as a weapon, besides that, is that unlike most bacteria, *B. anthracis* can turn into a "spore" form in which it is relatively resistant to stresses such as heat and dryness. This means it can be stockpiled and disseminated dry. Growing large quantities of the anthrax microbe is tricky. Nevertheless, both the United States and Russia made anthrax-based weapons during the Cold War.

Untreated, inhaled anthrax microbes are fatal about 80 percent of the time. The infection can be treated with antibiotics, although they are of little benefit once severe symptoms appear.

Other bacteria frequently mentioned as possible weapons are the ones responsible for plague(*Yersinia pestis*) and tularemia(*Franciscella tularensis*). Each infects wild animals, and could be obtained from them.

Pneumonic plague, in which the bacteria infects the lungs, is almost always fatal if untreated. Antibiotic therapy can cure it if started early, but once symptoms appear many people with pneumonic plague die even with antibiotics. There is no vaccine available in the United States.

Tularemia of the lungs is fatal about 50 percent of the time. Antibiotics can help.

Botulinum toxin, produced by the soil bacterium *Clostridium botulinum*, is often called the most toxic substance on Earth. "A single gram . . . evenly dispersed and inhaled would kill more than 1 million people," according to an article published in February in the Journal of the American Medical Association.

Making large quantities of the toxin requires an industrial operation, such as the one Iraq had before the Persian Gulf War, which allowed it to make about 5,000 gallons of concentrated material. Antitoxins exist but are in short supply. Intensive care, including the use of mechanical ventilators, can save some severely poisoned victims.

To produce mass casualties, airborne delivery would be the preferred method for unleashing all types of chemical or biological weapons. The poisoning of water supplies is unlikely, experts say, because the amount of toxic agent required would be prohibitively large.

Airborne delivery, however, is fraught with problems. There's an optimal size for particles to be inhaled into the lungs. Many terrorism experts are reluctant to discuss this topic, although details are readily available from many sources. In general, producing aerosols of the right size, either of liquids or powders, is extremely difficult or impossible without special equipment and expertise. Crop dusting sprayers, for instance, are designed to produce droplets many times larger than ideal. Weather conditions can also make a huge difference.

Efficiency, though, may be low on a terrorist's list of concerns. That fact alone raises the chance that some group may eventually attempt an act of terror using biological or chemical means.

"The chance of a large [bioweapons] attack that affects tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands is very small," said Zelicoff of Sandia. "But is that what the terrorist cares about? Inducing enough disease to produce panic or disrupt life is probably enough. I would posit that one or two cases of pulmonary anthrax in downtown Washington or New York would achieve that goal."

Staff writer Ceci Connolly contributed to this report.

Time
October 8, 2001

Diagnosing The Risks

By David Bjerklie, Christine Gorman and Alice Park, New York

In the three weeks since the Sept. 11 attacks, Americans have become increasingly concerned that the next one might be even worse. In the TIME/CNN poll taken last week, 53% of those surveyed feared a chemical or biological attack; 23% a nuclear strike. Among terrorism experts, however, the focus has shifted from a single large-scale assault--which would be difficult to pull off--to a series of smaller attacks that could be just as damaging to the U.S. economy and public morale. How serious are these threats? What form might they take? The best guesses of the experts consulted by TIME offer both reassurance and fresh cause for alarm.

Biochemical Attacks

Smallpox -- It doesn't take an exotic virus like Ebola to transform the U.S. into a hot zone. A single case of smallpox could put the entire nation at risk. The smallpox virus is highly contagious and would spread quickly because Americans are not vaccinated. Routine inoculations were halted in 1972. People vaccinated before 1972 lost most of their immunity within 10 years.

A terrorist who wanted to launch a smallpox attack, however, would probably have a very hard time getting hold of the virus. Smallpox was eradicated in 1980. Officially, only two stores of the virus exist, for research purposes, in secure locations in the U.S. and Russia. There may be covert stashes in Iraq, North Korea and Russia, but these countries would be reluctant to release them, fearing a smallpox epidemic among their own unvaccinated people. Even if a terrorist were successful in obtaining the virus, his plans could backfire: smallpox is so contagious that the first victims are likely to be the members of his own terrorist cell.

Anthrax -- Many bacterial agents can be used as bioweapons, including Clostridium botulinum (botulism) and Yersinia pestis (plague). But anthrax stands out because its spores are particularly hardy; they are resistant to sunlight, heat and disinfectant, and can remain active in soil and water for years. Anthrax occurs naturally in both wild and domestic animals--including cattle, sheep and camels. Infection from direct contact with affected animals is fatal in 20% of cases. If inhaled, however, anthrax spores cause death almost 90% of the time.

Yet manufacturing sufficient quantities of any bacteria in a stable form is a technical and scientific challenge; plague bugs, for example, degrade within hours when exposed to the sun, and anthrax spores tend to clump together in humid conditions. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo sprayed anthrax and botulism eight times over parts of Tokyo without effect.

Despite all the attention being given crop dusters, using one to spread germs is not as easy as it sounds. The planes are designed to spray pesticides in heavy, concentrated streams, whereas bioweapons are ideally scattered in a fine mist over as large an area as possible. The nozzles in crop dusters are best suited to discharging relatively large particles--100 microns in diameter--not tiny 1-micron specks of bacteria.

Sarin -- Unlike biological agents, which are living organisms that require proper conditions to survive, chemical weapons such as the nerve gases sarin and VX are relatively easy to acquire and stockpile. Chemicals are difficult to manufacture in sufficient quantities for a large-scale attack, however; more likely are isolated assaults such as the 1995 sarin attack on a Tokyo subway that injured thousands and killed 12.

Water

Reservoirs -- Poisoning your enemy's well is an ancient tradition, but would-be terrorists would find it extremely hard to inflict widespread casualties through our water supply. Chlorine in treated water kills most microbes, and huge quantities of chemical toxins would have to be dumped into a reservoir to make many people sick, let alone kill them. (A U.N. study estimated that it would take 10 tons of potassium cyanide.) Drinking water might be threatened locally, however, if someone managed to tap the pipe going into a building or neighborhood or infiltrate a water-treatment facility. With this threat in mind, municipal water authorities have stepped up security.

Dams -- If poisoning the water supply doesn't work, terrorists might try to cut it off or disrupt it. On an even grander scale, they might blow up a dam, causing widespread flooding damage downstream. Compounding the impact would be the loss of hydroelectric-power generation. With security beefed up at major dams across the country, however, especially at landmark behemoths such as the Hoover and Grand Coulee dams, it would take a very determined effort to carry out such an attack.

Hazardous Materials

Chemical plants -- Some 850,000 facilities in the U.S. handle hazardous chemicals. Many substances that have benign industrial uses, such as metal cleaning or photo developing, can in theory be turned into dangerous weapons. But gaining access to plants, either for sabotage or to get raw materials, is difficult. Employees handling hazardous materials undergo security background checks, and chemical manufacturers across the country last week were double-checking their employee rolls. Since Sept. 11, most facilities have barred outside visitors and allowed only authorized personnel to enter.

Trucking companies -- Dangerous chemicals are most vulnerable to interception while they are being transported. Today 2.5 million Americans have commercial driver's licenses to carry fuels and other hazardous materials. Truckers must pass two tests: the federally mandated 30-question multiple-choice test (states can add more questions) to obtain a commercial vehicle license and a separate test on the procedures for safely handling hazardous substances. After the arrest of about 20 people suspected of fraudulently obtaining haz-mat licenses, chemical companies tightened their transport policies, assigning two drivers to every vehicle and using satellite tracking systems to monitor haulers from pickup to drop-off.

Food

Salmonella -- As Oregon's Rajneeshee cult demonstrated in 1984, it is not difficult to set off a wave of food poisonings. Indeed, gastroenteritis caused by natural contamination and careless food handling afflicts millions and results in 5,000 deaths each year. The Rajneeshees considered a number of different viruses and bacteria, including those that cause hepatitis and typhus, but decided for their purposes (disrupting the outcome of a local election) on a strain of salmonella that would be debilitating but not fatal. Salmonella poisonings tend to be localized. With proper hygiene, the bacterium is not particularly contagious.

E. coli -- An even easier bug to obtain is the familiar intestinal parasite E. coli. Naturally occurring outbreaks of E. coli, typically the result of fecal contamination in anything from hamburgers to swimming pools, sicken hundreds of thousands of Americans each year. In New York City this spring, a man was arrested after he was spotted spraying what turned out to be feces-laden water over the contents of a midtown salad bar (fortunately, no one got sick). A far more virulent strain of the bacterium called O157:H7 is sometimes fatal, but identifying and isolating the right strain is beyond the technical capabilities of most terrorists.

Foot-and-mouth disease -- A terrorist attack aimed at crops and livestock would be less dramatic but might cause more disruption in the long run. Such attempts are not unheard of. In World War II, Britain accused Germany of dropping small cardboard bombs filled with beetle pests on English potato fields, and in the 1980s Tamil militants threatened to target Sri Lankan tea and rubber plantations with plant pathogens.

Perhaps the most worrisome threat to U.S. agriculture is foot-and-mouth disease, which can spread with astonishing speed in sheep, cattle and swine. Not seen in this country since 1929, the disease is harmless to humans but renders farm animals economically worthless. The U.S. could be forced to destroy much of its own livestock, as Great Britain had to do earlier this year.

Explosives

Car, truck and backpack bombs -- Exotic weapons get a lot of attention, but conventional explosives and suicide bombers in pizza parlors, discotheques and shopping malls can spread terror with stunning effectiveness. Fertilizer bombs like the one that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Okla., in 1995 could wreak havoc with bridges, tunnels and buildings. Nuclear-power and chemical-manufacturing plants make even more horrifying targets. The 1984 leak at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, may have killed 3,000. Estimates of the final death toll from the 1986 explosion in the Chernobyl nuclear plant run as high as 30,000.
Nuclear weapons -- The ultimate nightmare would be terrorists in the U.S. wielding nuclear weapons. For this reason, the ability to create--or worse, steal or buy--weapons-grade plutonium has long been an issue of great concern and international intrigue. Fortunately, the practical difficulties in acquiring precisely the right materials, not to mention the engineering know-how to jerry-build a nuclear device successfully, make this type of threat highly unlikely.

Time
October 8, 2001

America's First Bioterrorism Attack

Annals of germ warfare

By Philip Elmer-Dewitt

In the fall of 1984, members of the Rajneeshee, a Buddhist cult devoted to beauty, love and guiltless sex, brewed a "salsa" of salmonella and sprinkled it on fruits and veggies in the salad bar at Shakey's Pizza in The Dalles, Ore. They put it in blue-cheese dressing, table-top coffee creamers and potato salads at 10 local restaurants and a supermarket. They poured it into a glass of water and handed it to a judge. They fed it to the district attorney, the doctor, the dentist. Their plan: to seize control of the county government by packing polling booths with imported homeless people while making local residents too sick to vote.

It was the first large-scale bioterrorism attack on American soil, but it didn't get much attention at the time. Nobody died--although at least 751 people got very sick. There was no Fox News or MSNBC to report every case of gastroenteritis. And the federal officials called in to investigate held off publishing a study of the incident for fear of encouraging copycats.

Now the Rajneeshee attack is back in the news, thanks to Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War, a new best seller that--by a stroke of publishing fortune--landed in bookstores the day the World Trade Center was destroyed. Its three authors, journalists at the New York Times--Middle East reporter Judith Miller, science writer William Broad and investigations editor Stephen Engelberg--were prebooked on the TV publicity circuit. Over the past few weeks, they have been everywhere, retailing their horror stories of Soviet germ weapons programs, Iraqi anthrax stockpiles, Japanese nerve-gas attacks and an American biowarfare defense program in denial and disarray.

How dire is the situation? The book is of two--or perhaps three--minds about it. Large sections are meticulously reported, offering eyewitness descriptions of four-story Soviet anthrax-fermenting tanks and behind-the-scenes accounts of the Pentagon's scramble to make enough vaccine to protect half a million Gulf War troops from an Iraqi germ attack (it fell 350,000 doses short). Other sections repeat uncritically the most alarmist anecdotes--such as the assertion, lifted from an obscure 1988 book, that the U.S. secretly sprayed American cities with mild germs to investigate the likely impact of deadly pathogens.

Germs is peppered with internal contradictions. Does a 5-lb. bag of anthrax contain enough spores to kill thousands or, as the book also claims, every man, woman and child on the planet? (The first estimate is much closer to the mark.)

No hype was necessary; the verifiable facts are chilling enough--and, in places, eerily prescient. Take the 1995 closed-door briefing for President Clinton and 400 officials from the U.S., Canada, Britain and Japan by Bill Patrick, former chief of the Army's bioweapons-development program. Patrick described how terrorists--armed with blenders, cheesecloth, garden sprayers and starter bugs mail-ordered from a U.S. germ bank--could spray enough deadly bacteria in the air intakes of the World Trade Center to infect 25,000 people. If that didn't scare anybody then, it will now.

Boston Globe
September 27, 2001
Pg. 22

A Heightened Alert For Bioterrorism

Detection system is keeping health officials apprised

By Raja Mishra, Globe Staff

For more than two weeks, since just minutes after the destruction of the World Trade Center, Boston has been on heightened alert for bioterrorist attacks - with health officials now constantly scouring the area for signs that deadly bugs or chemicals have been unleashed.

Unlike the fiery Sept. 11 jetliner attacks in New York and Washington, a bioterrorist assault would most likely unfold silently, becoming apparent only after patients started to fill emergency rooms. Without early detection, infectious viruses could spread quickly, and fatalities could grow.

Boston health officals said yesterday that the city's bioterrorism detection system, initiated in 1999, can detect a chemical or biological assault within 24 hours.

"We've been working on this for two years and I think that we have a very good surveillance system in place," said Dr. Anita Barry of the Boston Public Health Commission, who runs the local system.

"I've always taken bioterrorism very seriously. These types of things can happen," she said. "We need to be alert and do the best we can to catch them early."

Just minutes after the World Trade Center attack, Barry received an emergency e-mail from the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention placing Boston, along with dozens of other cities, on heightened alert.

Boston has long been considered a "second-tier" target by the federal government because of its bustling airport, steady tourist traffic, and world-class universities. New York and Washington are considered first-tier targets.

The local emergency detection system consists of a computer network connecting 11 local hospital emergency rooms with Barry's office in downtown Boston.

At 7 a.m., her computer automatically receieves overnight ER statistics and reports; surprising upticks in cases involving the central nervous system, gastrointestinal illness, meningitis, and other uncommon afflictions are immediately investigated. To date, none have been detected.

But many biological agents work slowly and somewhat anonymously.

"Many of the agents do begin with nonspecific symptoms - headaches, nausea, coughs," said Barry. "If there is a cluster of those illnesses, we would follow it up."

Most major cities have similar system in place, funded by a $160 million federal grant created in 1998 after US intelligence agents determined that Iraq was developing biological weapons. But many rural areas are without the rapid detection systems.

Biological attacks could involve highly infectious viruses like smallpox, or hemorrhagic fever; bacteria like anthrax, pneumonic plague, and tularemia; or toxins like botulism.

Agents like anthrax and smallpox can travel through the air and take days to make people sick. Others might be spread through the water supply, though the chlorine used in water purification would kill many harmful biological agents.

In the case of an attack, patients might be scattered around a geographic area.

Without regional information-sharing, it might take days to determine that an attack had occurred - a deadly scenario given that many biological agents require quick antidotes to prevent them from killing. And infectious agents, given a head start, could spread to hundreds of people.

The only biological attack in the United States to date occurred in 1984, when members of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cult contaminated salad bars in The Dalles, Ore. Though no one died, about 750 people were sickened and it took authorities a year to unravel the plot.

If a wide-scale bioterrorist attack were detected now, the federal government would send by cargo plane a 50-ton emergency kit, containing more than 900 cases of pills, 2,500 cases of intravenous medicines, and considerable supplies of emergency care equipment. Local fire departments, hospitals, clinics, emergency medical services, and police would be mobilized to distribute the medicine.

And it appears the Boston area will be on heightened bioterror alert for the foreseeable future, said Barry.

"We have no plans to discontinue this system," she said.

Miami Herald
September 27, 2001

Chemical, Biological War Front Particularly Difficult To Defend

By William Yardley and Phil Long

As expectations rise for a United States military response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the borderless and stateless war against terrorism appears to have one front that could prove particularly daunting and difficult to defend.

Crop-spraying planes, trucks hauling hazardous materials, water treatment plants, mosquito control trucks and planes, zoos, theme parks, seafood processors, slaughterhouses: All are conceivable conduits for the introduction of invisible but deadly chemical or biological weapons.

Florida and other states have begun to look far more closely at ways to protect and monitor what are considered to be vulnerable services and industries.

But while experts say the threat is real, some are restrained while others are impassioned. Some say carrying out such acts could be too complicated for a small cell of terrorists -- unless they had scientific and financial support from a terrorist state.

Others say a combination of fanatical devotion to a cause and terrorist connections are all that is necessary.

``I'm not sitting here trying to suggest this is going to happen at all, but the problem is the consequences are so high,'' said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. ``That's the bottom line message. If they are lucky even just once with this, we're in trouble.''

Osterholm is co-author of the alarmingly titled Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe.

Jonathan B. Tucker, a biological and chemical weapons expert at the Monterey (Calif) Institute of International Studies, said the imminence of the bio-chemical terrorism threat has been ``somewhat overstated'' in the weeks since Sept. 11.

``We shouldn't exaggerate the imminence of the threat and start buying gas masks, but I don't want to be complacent about it, either. Clearly the motivation is there, but there are very significant technical hurdles that have to be overcome,'' Tucker said. ``It's not an imminent threat, but it is a growing threat that we need to address.''

Tucker, author of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox, acknowledged the conflict he and other experts face in discussing bio-chemical terrorism with an increasingly fascinated media.

``Educate the public but not the terrorist -- I think that's the dilemma here,'' he said.

Both men say the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prove that terrorists are capable of committing to complicated, long-range planning -- and that lesson is causing many to rethink the threat of bio-chemical terrorism.

They and many others also say the country's public health infrastructure is not prepared to handle bio-chemical terrorism.

Even after the attack, chemical and biological terrorism seemed remote and abstract to some, but concern spiked early this week with news that FBI agents had interviewed a crop-spraying operation in South Florida where suspected hijackers apparently inquired about flying one of the planes.

Then a Homestead banker said the same man, Mohamed Atta, asked about getting a loan because he was interested in buying a crop-spraying plane.

And on Wednesday, a Canadian crop-sprayer in the Saskatchewan province said he spoke with investigators after receiving e-mails and phone calls from a suspicious man interested in acquiring a crop-sprayer before and after the attacks.

Crop-spraying pilots -- they call themselves aerial applicators -- say flying their planes, which feature unusual takeoff and landing gear, is complicated and that pilots usually spend years in apprenticeships before becoming pilots. They say the limited flying skills the suspected hijackers reportedly had would not have been enough.

But aside from the challenges of flying the planes, their mechanisms for dispensing fertilizer and pesticide would not necessarily spread bacteria such as anthrax or chemicals such as VX in a manner that would cause the numbers of deaths terrorists might seek.

Tucker said the planes would likely require significant modification.

``It would probably not be very effective,'' he said, adding that spray planes, which hold only a few hundred gallons of fuel and spray, ``would have to make multiple sorties.''
Osterholm said bio-chemical threats could come in many forms. He conjures a gruesome scenario to illustrate how smallpox, a deadly disease conquered in the United States decades ago, could be resurrected.
``Put 40 warriors in a room who are willing to die, expose them to smallpox, then put them on a plane to the United States. Watch what would happen when they start getting sick, and they are walking the sidewalks, the airports, the trains stations, the subways.''
He dismisses reports that stocks of smallpox are securely kept in just a few places worldwide.
``Even if only one or two nefarious places have it, or the ability to buy it, all you have to do is put a little bit of it out there. The bottom line message is, we are ill-prepared in this country from a public health standpoint to confront these issues.''
Tucker, however, does not consider smallpox ``a likely threat,'' although he said ``there may be undeclared stock in Iraq and North Korea.''
Tucker said ``terrorists of this type are more likely to use a low-tech approach -- sabotaging a chemical plant, blowing up a truck carrying hazardous materials -- things like that, which could be low-tech but cause a lot of damage.''
Florida Highway Patrol troopers and other law enforcement agencies have been put on alert for anything suspicious involving trucks that might be carrying hazardous materials.
Most ``hazmat'' trucks carry gasoline or diesel fuel. In descending order of volume, others carry liquid petroleum products, ``corrosives'' like batteries, poisonous gases ranging from chlorine to pesticides, and explosives. A very small percentage of ``hazmat'' trucks carry radioactive products such as spent fuel from nuclear power plants.
Hazmat trucks bear diamond-shaped signs on the front, back, and sides of vehicles. The signs bear numeric codes for the substances being carried.
The symptoms and effects of chemical and biological weapons vary. Some kill instantly, others make people sick days after being exposed to them.
In 1995, a Japanese cult released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, killing 12 and injuring thousands.
But Tucker said that terrorist act, while lethal, also proves how difficult it is for terrorists to cause massive fatalities with chemical as opposed to biological weapons.
``To inflict casualties requires a very large quantity -- we're talking literally metric tons -- of chemicals. You couldn't just release a vial of sarin from a building and kill a significant number of people,'' he said.

San Diego Union-Tribune
September 27, 2001

Preparations For Bioterror Here Improve

By Cheryl Clark, Staff Writer
The new buzzword for terror is biochemical.
And it has many San Diego County health providers fearful over the region's vulnerability as a military base, international border and tourist mecca.
How bad could it be, and is the county ready? The answer is anyone's guess, area disaster officials acknowledge.
"We're getting better at preparing," said Emergency Medical Services coordinator Steven Wood. "But there's always something else we can do."
Identifying the biochemical agent used in an attack is key to a response, said state and local officials. But San Diego labs aren't qualified or equipped to deal with certain organisms.
Suspected smallpox and hemorrhagic fever viruses such as Ebola would have to be relayed to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta for testing. The bacteria that causes botulism would have to be analyzed at state labs in Los Angeles or Berkeley.
San Diego County health officials decline to say how much medication, antidotes or vaccines are available immediately or where they are stored. But it is clear that, if an attack were big enough, there wouldn't be enough for everyone.
"We have enough medical supplies on hand right now to put a significant dent in the process, and if we had 1,000 victims, it would be a piece of cake," Wood said. But, he cautioned, it would depend on what treatment they required.

The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile system, a network of medication routinely rotated to avoid expiration, would have special supplies within 12 hours, said Dr. Michael Ascher, chief of the state Department of Health Services Viral and Rickettsial Diseases in Berkeley.
Also, members of the 30-branch federally certified Disaster Medical Assistance Teams -- physicians, nurses, pharmacists and others trained in emergency medicine -- would fly here to help.
The 9th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support team of the California National Guard, a 22-member team trained in retrieval and analysis of biological, chemical and radiation hazards, could be sent from its base in Los Alamitos, near Long Beach.
"San Diego is one of the more prepared, because of all our threats," said Wood, who is in some ways grateful for a hoax several years ago in which an envelope claiming to contain anthrax spores was found in a local hotel, activating a relay network of response teams in a kind of dress rehearsal.
Dr. Michael Sise, trauma physician at Scripps Mercy Hospital, agreed. All county emergency responders, including hospitals, police, fire and paramedics, "drill for chemical and biological warfare, and we all have decontamination capabilities."

Washington Post
September 29, 2001
Pg. 1

Military Grapples With New Role In Homeland Defense

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

As the U.S. military moves ships, warplanes and Special Forces units overseas for the looming battle against Osama bin Laden and his allies, the Pentagon is confronting the broader question of how to reorganize the armed forces for the other side of that campaign: defending the continental United States.
Under a proposal sent to the Pentagon leadership yesterday, the Marine Corps would establish a new, brigade-size counterterrorism unit that would be larger than any such unit in the military. It would be able to pour more than 1,000 specially trained troops into missions both overseas and at home, Marine officials said.
The plan is the first stage of what is likely to become a significant restructuring of the armed forces in the aftermath of this month's terrorist attacks as the Pentagon seeks to improve its ability not only to fight terrorists abroad, but also to defend the country against assaults at home.
The Army is considering the creation of a command for homeland defense. The Air Force is mulling whether it will have to permanently provide personnel and airplanes to help the Air National Guard carry out the combat air patrols being flown over New York, Washington and other U.S. cities. The Navy might be asked to occasionally deploy Aegis cruisers to provide antiaircraft defenses along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as it did immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington.
The campaign against terrorism has inverted the traditional division of labor within the military in which conventional forces focus on fighting wars while smaller, specialized units carry out missions such as fighting terrorists. President Bush alluded to this change yesterday, saying that "it is very hard to fight . . . a guerrilla war with conventional forces." He declined to discuss details but said, "Make no mistake about it -- we're in hot pursuit" of terrorists.
The Pentagon has already deployed troops, including Special Forces units, to Pakistan and the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in central Asia. Special Forces are expected to carry out many of the ground missions in any war against bin Laden, Defense Department officials said.
Pentagon spokesman yesterday refused to comment on reports that Special Forces units were already operating in Afghanistan, and Defense Department officials denied a report in USA Today that they were on the ground actively hunting for bin Laden.
Defense of the homeland, the other front in the counter-terrorism war, has not been a worry for the armed forces since the height of the Cold War, when more than 250 Army batteries of Nike nuclear-tipped guided missiles ringed Washington and other U.S. cities.
The biggest changes are probably in store for the ground forces, officials said. According to one proposal, the Army's new command for homeland defense would report directly to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, one official said.

The Air Force also is going to have to consider whether to commit active-duty forces to helping the Air National Guard execute combat air patrols over the continental United States, an official said.
The change that appears furthest along is the Marines' proposal to create a big, new anti-terrorism unit. "We think we can jump-start this thing right now," a Marine official said yesterday. He said that if Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld approves the concept, which the Marines think could happen this weekend, the Corps will immediately begin setting up the unit.
The unit would be headquartered at Camp Lejeune, N.C., and would be built around an existing infantry battalion. It also would include three other existing Marine organizations trained in security-related missions -- the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, which has two elite companies that provide anti-terrorism security to deployed Navy ships; the Marine Security Guard Battalion, which provides internal security at U.S. embassies; and its small Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, which was created several years ago in response to worries about terrorism.
To carry out those units' current missions and also take on the new mission of responding quickly to major terrorist attacks, the Marines would have to increase the size of those units, the official said.
Also, he said, the Marine Corps would need to spend about $21 million to supplement the infantry battalion's equipment, buying additional communications gear as well as more night-vision devices. Giving the unit specialized training and maintaining the extra gear would cost about $10 million a year, he said.
Once fully outfitted and trained, the unit would be able to deploy a company within 24 hours, and the full brigade within 72, he said.
The new Marine brigade would not be included in the Pentagon's lengthy review of how to change the military to meet new threats, called the Quadrennial Defense Review, which will be released next week. That report was largely completed before the attacks.

U.S. News & World Report
October 8, 2001

A Sudden Need To Feel Secure

But the challenges for 'homeland defense' are as broad as our borders and freedoms

By Linda Robinson

Kendra Dade is a Washington, D.C., cop with a new beat: guarding the Georgetown Reservoir, a principal water supply for the nation's capital. She parks her cruiser each day at the chain-link fence, just beyond the water's edge, to pull her share of a 24-hour shift to guard against terrorism. "We should have been doing it long before," she says. Her new assignment is just one measure of how much life has changed, and how quickly, since the terrorist attacks of September 11. No longer is the idea of contaminating a city's water supply the province of cinematic imagination. And for every reservoir, there is a bridge, an airport, a seaway, or a nuclear or chemical plant. All have come to be seen as potential targets, all in need of a newfound source of protection.
President Bush opened a new front in the war against terrorism by creating a cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security, installing his longtime pal, Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge, as the first director. But when Ridge enters the White House next Monday, he faces a bureaucratic thicket of 40 different government agencies (with their often competing budget priorities) and the seemingly overwhelming job of being responsible for the nation's internal defense systems. Given the breadth of the task–his strong personal relationship with the president notwithstanding–one of his greatest challenges will be to make the office more than a national cheerleader for public safety. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card tells U.S. News that Ridge's new department will function much like the National Security Council, primarily in an advisory role.
Ridge will also have some high-powered help. Retired Gen. Wayne Downing, the first chief of the Special Operations command, will be named deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, U.S. News has learned. Their challenge will be to make real all the rhetoric about shoring up the nation's many security weaknesses and at the same time not trample venerated freedoms.
Not since the dawn of the nuclear age after World War II has the nation required such a profound shift in its thinking about security. The National Security Act of 1947, signed by President Truman, brought disparate branches of the military under the Department of Defense and created the Central Intelligence Agency. On the home front, the

government implemented a massive public education campaign, which came to be symbolized by schoolchildren practicing "duck-and-cover" exercises and legions of civil defense workers conducting mock disaster drills.

Warnings ignored. Now, federal officials face a far different threat and need a different architecture for domestic security. Terrorism is often characterized by a tight clutch of individuals inflicting mass destruction. And so far, the United States has been slow to adapt. In a detailed report that was largely ignored, former Sens. Gary Hart and Warren Rudman concluded that terrorist attacks on U.S. soil were the nation's No. 1 threat, and they urged the creation of a homeland security agency.

Perhaps their warnings were not taken seriously in a country that had not been invaded since the War of 1812. That's all changed, and there are even more dire alarms being sounded, including scenarios where the death tolls could be 10 times that of the terrorist attacks.

The White House says Ridge will be coordinating the tasks and budgets of the various agencies. But many in Congress believe his authority is too limited. "The president and the Congress will have to give him the tools to do the job," says Sen. Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican and a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Sen. Joseph Lieberman, a Connecticut Democrat and chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, adds: "If you want to get the job of homeland defense done, you need to make the person head of an agency that has control over the budgets of the people working under him." That's not currently the case.

Yet all eyes will be on Ridge and his office as the nation struggles with its collective sense of security. Prevention is at once the most important part of his mandate and the one most riven with problems. The essence of prevention is intelligence gathering that can be used to pre-empt attacks. U.S. intelligence operatives have been hampered both in strategy and tactics since Congress cracked down on renegade intelligence operations in the mid-1970s. "You can't catch terrorists with choir boys," says Maurice Sonnenberg, who served on the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1993 until 2001. And there long has been a natural tension between intelligence agencies and the FBI.

The new era, and the new technologies that have emerged, also require rethinking the balance between national security and law enforcement. In the telegraph era, privacy concerns did not prevent operators from reading messages they transmitted, but unauthorized disclosures were punished.

Front lines. Protection is primarily the work of frontline defense agencies like Customs, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard. These chronically strapped agencies inspect only 2 or 3 percent of the traffic; they use paper-based systems instead of computers; and their radios do not share frequencies, so they couldn't collaborate even if they wanted to. And each is in a sense a stepchild of a much larger agency. Customs is a branch of Treasury, the Coast Guard a part of Transportation, and the Border Patrol an arm of Justice.

Response is perhaps the least problematic of the three tasks Ridge faces. FEMA has handled many natural disasters with its regional office network coordinating federal, state, and local emergency response. The National Guard functions as a state militia to be deployed by governors, and the U.S. military's Joint Task Force for Civil Support provides backup. But all these pieces must be coordinated and drilled to function as a seamless whole. And while the military would be called upon in the event of a massive nuclear or chemical attack, most of the nation's civilian "first responders" lack advanced training. For lack of funds, the Justice Department's domestic preparedness program has been able to school only 71,000 of the nation's 11 million fire, police, and emergency personnel.

At no time in the nation's history has the need for a homeland defense been more obvious and the consequences of having our guard down more agonizingly apparent. In this campaign for protection, we won't be relying on Cold War cartoon character Bert the Turtle's exhortation to baby boomers to "duck and cover."

With Samantha Levine, Douglas Pasternak, and Kenneth T. Walsh

Time
October 8, 2001

"A Clear And Present Danger"

As Americans worry about truck bombs, germ warfare and worse, they wonder: Can our government do anything to stop the next terror attack?

By Michael Elliott

The phone lines in the office of Sheriff Bruce Bryant, of York County, S.C., started burning up around 8 p.m. on the night of Saturday, Sept. 15. Helicopters had been seen heading up the Catawba River toward a nuclear power station. Soon two F-16 fighter jets arrived on the scene, and Bryant heard a "tremendous, thunderous noise." A little later, choppers were spotted near the Oconee nuclear plant near Clemson, 90 miles away. Then, shortly after midnight, several more were reported flying over the Savannah River Site, a Department of Energy facility that occupies more than 360 sq. mi. along the border of South Carolina and Georgia. Nuclear waste is disposed of there, and weapons are restocked with tritium. Authorities closed down a highway that runs through the base, until the FBI gave the all clear. But Bryant and his frightened neighbors still don't know what happened that night. Utility-industry analysts say Catawba was subject to a security test, but the feds won't confirm anything. "It's like it never happened," says John Paolucci, of the South Carolina emergency preparedness service. "But it did."

If people in York County are nervous, they've got a huge support group. America has become a jittery nation since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and with good reason. Attorney General John Ashcroft appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee and declared that "terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today." Information available to the FBI, Ashcroft continued, "indicates a potential for additional terrorist incidents." He didn't bother to add what everyone knew: the next incidents could be even more ghastly than those of Sept. 11. A terrorist group prepared to murder more than 6,000 civilians would feel no compunction about killing 60,000--or 600,000--if it could deploy the necessary weapons of mass destruction. And so the fear of such an attack--and the government's hasty efforts to contain the threat--became the nation's No. 1 item of business.

From coast to coast, Americans experienced things for which they were quite unprepared. State troopers patrolled airports. "It was like traveling through a combat zone," said Marcia Brier, from Needham, Mass., of a trip from Boston's Logan Airport. At Reagan National Airport in Washington, the gleaming, airy terminal that opened in 1997 remained closed. A tanker carrying 33 million gallons of liquefied natural gas was diverted from highly populated Boston Harbor to Louisiana, just as a precaution. In Idaho and Maryland, there were panicky rumors of missing crop dusters. The Los Angeles subway was shut down for the first time in its history, as passengers complained of dizziness and itchy eyes. No chemical agents were found.

All the while, law-enforcement officers were continuing the greatest dragnet the world had ever seen. FBI sources downplayed the possibility of a second wave of attacks. But less than three weeks after the catastrophe, Ashcroft said that a total of 480 people had already been arrested or detained. Hundreds more had been picked up around the globe, with authorities paying particular attention to possible terrorist support networks in Germany and Britain. Those scooped up included a few who appeared to have links to the hijackers, and some who just had the wrong sort of look at the wrong sort of time. In DeFuniak Springs, a small town in the Florida panhandle, a local librarian remembered that the hijackers had used library computers to book flight reservations, saw a man from the Middle East seated at a keyboard and called the police. (The man was guilty of nothing.) Those driving into Manhattan were stuck in lines of the sort usually seen only in Bangkok or Mexico City, as authorities made carpools compulsory and searched every van and truck, especially those licensed to carry hazardous materials. "This is how it is because this is how it has to be," said a law-enforcement official, according to the New York Post. "This is a police state now."

It's not. But there was a pervasive sense that things weren't as they had been. How could they be, when the President gave the Pentagon the authority to shoot down any hijacked civilian airliner? Pundits quickly learned to trot out the phrase "homeland security," with its faintly Orwellian overtones. And, as often happens in national emergencies, the desire of law enforcement for a free hand bumped into the rights and protections set down by men in wigs in the late 18th century.

In one sense, that's surprising, because in recent years the police have pretty much got what they asked for. As recently as 1998, the year that terrorists bombed two American embassies in Africa, President Clinton granted law-enforcement officials a wish list of extra investigative powers. "Any one of these extremely valuable tools," said a senior FBI official at the time, "could be the keystone" to a successful operation against terrorists. For the bureau, it seems, no kit ever has enough tools. Three years later, it is back for more. In the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Ashcroft seeks to give cops and the FBI yet more powers, including a provision that would allow the Justice Department to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism indefinitely, in contrast to the current time limit of 48 hours. A coalition of civil libertarians and conservatives suspicious of big government has slowed the bill's progress through Congress. Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Patrick Leahy told TIME that "the biggest danger is that [terrorists] unravel the constitutional protections we've spent 200 years as a democracy to build." By last Thursday, however, Leahy was on the phone to Ashcroft, suggesting that staff members work through the weekend to iron out the remaining points of disagreement.

If fear can erode constitutional protections, it can also eat the soul. Few objects speak to numbing, nameless dread so much as the gas mask, which not long ago seemed an artifact of World War I battlefields. Now there is a run on them. The Army Surplus Warehouse in Idaho Falls sold 180 masks through its website in two hours. A man in New

York placed an order for 500 masks for his employees; they work in an office building near ground zero. A book on germ warfare became an unexpected best seller.

Across the country, people changed their behavior--Come to think of it, why shouldn't my teenage girl have a cell phone?--and redefined their lives. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd reported that her chums were debating the finer points of gas masks and antibiotics. St. Petersburg and Pinellas County, Fla., are among the few localities in the country that, under the auspices of the military, have held practice drills to respond to chemical and biological disasters. Says Lieutenant Scott Stiener of the Pinellas County sheriff's office: "We're going to have to be a lot more suspicious." Stiener wonders if we'll be able to trust the guy who comes to spray our house or office for bugs; he may have something dangerous in his can. Life has already changed for Bryan McCraw, police chief of the small town of Guin, Ala. McCraw ticketed a Saudi driver for running a red light on Labor Day but didn't search the car. On Sept. 11, cops stopped the same man for driving with a flat tire near Washington's Dulles Airport and found flight manuals in the vehicle. "I'm looking for drugs. I'm not looking for flight manuals," said McCraw. "Somebody is going to have to train us on what to do."

Somebody is going to have to train us all. As Governor Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania prepares to step into his new job as director of Homeland Security, Americans want to know how real these threats are. You don't buy gas masks unless you expect an unspeakable horror. So people are asking: What are the chances that the clear and present danger will manifest as attacks using biological agents like anthrax or smallpox, or chemical compounds like sarin? Will they be sprayed from a crop duster or dumped in the water supply? What is the likelihood that the next attack would be marked not by smoke drifting from lower Manhattan to Brooklyn but by a mushroom cloud?

Officials cannot afford to be sanguine, but when it comes to biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, they try to be realistic. There have been reports that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network has tried to buy fissile material and has experimented with chemical agents. But "it's very difficult for terrorists to manufacture, transport and dispense these types of weapons," says a counterterrorism official. (The spray nozzles on your garden-variety crop duster, for example, are not ideal for the dispersal of deadly germs.) In the Pentagon, officials take the same view: weapons of mass destruction, they think, are beyond the range of "nonstate" actors. Terrorists have so far not been able to acquire an assembled nuclear weapon. Nor do they have the expertise to build and deliver one.

But that's no reason not to make their job as difficult as we possibly can. In 1991, Congress passed a wide-ranging law--named for its principal sponsors, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar--to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. Nunn-Lugar and other programs spend $872 million a year to safeguard the former Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction. Washington has had some spectacular successes in this field; in 1994, more than 1,300 lbs. of fissile material were airlifted from Kazakhstan to the U.S. But critics contend that Nunn-Lugar is underfunded. The Bush Administration has proposed cutting its budget $100 million this year, a sum that took $20 million out of a program designed to find jobs for unemployed Russian nuclear scientists. Now we must hope they haven't gone to work for bin Laden.

But even if Nunn-Lugar were goldplated, it wouldn't obviate the great lesson of Sept. 11: you don't need so-called weapons of mass destruction to devastate a society. A few airplanes will do. "That's why it was so brilliant," says a Pentagon official. A senior aide to Vice President Dick Cheney falls back on football metaphors. The Administration remains worried about the need to defend against "the long bomb"--a chemical, biological or nuclear attack. But just as crucial, this aide argues, is to protect against "short yardage"--attacks on bridges, tunnels, power plants, chemical-storage facilities and refineries. "There are hundreds of these targets," says a Pentagon official, "and attacking them with conventional means--a truck full of explosives--is a heck of a lot easier than building an atom bomb or a chemical weapon."

That's why, among those paid to think about the ultimate horror, the phrase of the moment is not "weapons of mass destruction" but "weapons of mass effect." The planes that flew into the World Trade Center were just such weapons. They were "conventional," in a sense, but designed to cause great loss of life and spread chaos and despair. The hijackers didn't need sophisticated technology. Nor may their successors. The East Coast power grid, for example, has less than half a dozen key switching points. Six truck bombs, packed with nothing more sophisticated than the fertilizer that blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City six years ago, could disrupt the economy of half the nation.

That's precisely what the bad guys had in mind the last time the U.S. faced a serious threat to homeland security. In 1942 two German submarines landed teams of four people each at Amagansett, N.Y., and Ponte Vedra, Fla. The Germans were supposed to blow up hydroelectric plants, key railroad junctions and spread terror in New York by bombing railroad stations and Jewish-owned department stores. The operation was a fiasco; within two weeks, all eight men were caught (six were later executed), but the threat was, and is, real.

All of which helps explain the attention now being paid to hazardous-material licenses. From July 1999 to January 2000, authorities say, an examiner in the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation issued commercial driver's

licenses to 20 men without requiring them to take mandatory tests. All but two of the licenses covered haz-mat transport. By the end of last week, all 20 men were in custody. The FBI said that they did not appear to have a connection to the Sept. 11 attacks. But that was scant comfort; they might have had their own scary plans. At the least, the scam exposed gaping holes in the haz-mat licensing process--there are 2.5 million of the licenses nationwide, and in some states they're a notorious source of kickbacks.

It was another reminder that guarding against weapons of mass destruction may miss the real threat. When 100 Florida law-enforcement officials, utility executives and emergency-response officials met in Tallahassee last week, it wasn't a nuclear or biological threat that was most on their mind. It was a conventional attack on the Port of Miami, on the Sunshine Skyway that spans Tampa Bay, or on that most American of symbols, Walt Disney World. Tom Ridge has the square-jawed profile and can-do resume--blue-collar background, Harvard, staff sergeant in Vietnam--to reassure even the most jittery parent contemplating a family vacation in Orlando. Ridge will need all that and more. He has not yet assumed his new post, which does not require a Senate vote. Officials have "red tagged" his security clearance, hoping he can get the O.K. in two weeks, not the eight months that some Administration officials have been waiting. In a series of White House meetings this week, Ridge started to divide his responsibilities into three baskets. The first will concentrate on emergency response, building on the work of the existing Federal Emergency Management Agency. A second will look at "hardening" targets now so soft that they may tempt terrorists. In the third basket, working with Bush's National Security Council (of which Ridge will be a member), the new office will seek to coordinate intelligence and law-enforcement activities against terrorism. Senior Administration officials have promised that Ridge will be given budget "pass-back" authority, which means that he will be able to direct the agencies under his purview, like the border patrol, to reorder their spending priorities. His staff is expected to be about 100 strong, many detailed from other agencies. Ridge has already picked Mark Holman, his oldest and most trusted political associate, to run the operation as chief of staff, and is eyeing Admiral Steve Abbott, who has been the military voice on the homeland-security staff currently housed in the Vice President's office. White House officials say Ridge will have as much access to the President as Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser. In the currency of Washington, that's saying a lot, for nobody has more. Ridge, White House officials say, will probably soon have an office in the West Wing.

It had better be a big one, with copious bookshelves and an acre of bare wall. The shelves can hold the reports, of which there have been depressingly many, on the nation's lack of preparedness for homeland security. (The three most recent ones total more than 500 dire pages. And the new General Accounting Office report says that federal bioterrorism defense is so chaotic the agencies can't even agree on which threats to worry about.) The wall space is needed for Ridge's organizational chart, for he will have to coordinate the activities of more than 40 federal agencies--and an unknown but much larger number in state and local governments. On Capitol Hill, if Ridge is ever foolish enough to stray into the building where he served 12 years as a member of the House, 26 full committees of Congress and 17 subcommittees deal with homeland-security matters.

Coordinate is the key word here. Against the recommendations of the recent commission on national security chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, Ridge will not be in charge of a superagency into which have been folded operational arms of the Federal Government like FEMA. That may be a mistake. If there is one thing more depressing than the number of reports on homeland security, it is the unanimity of their conclusions. At present, coordination simply doesn't happen; homeland defense is a patchwork quilt made by an inept seamstress. Some stories would be funny if they weren't being told against a backdrop of tragedy. There was the recent joint exercise of the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, during which agents argued for an hour over who was in charge, while actors playing the dead and dying got hypothermia. There is the sad tale of the Center for Defense Preparedness run by the Department of Justice, which "trains trainers" to respond to toxic emergencies--and whose current budget allows it to operate at 25% of capacity. There is the rivalry--or is it hatred?--between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service, neither of which seems ever to have willingly shared a piece of information with the other.

For old hands, though, one rivalry dwarfs all the others. A senior adviser to President George H.W. Bush says that the historic tensions between G-men and spooks at times seem insurmountable. "One of the things we need," says Senator Harry Reid, "is someone with the authority to force the CIA and the FBI to cooperate."

The incompatibilities run deep. The bureau's job is to find evidence that will stand up in a criminal court, while the agency just wants intelligence. But some observers think the old enmities have abated. The deputy director of each agency's counterterrorism division comes from the other one, and joint FBI-CIA operations have had a few notable successes. The real problem, says Representative Saxby Chambliss, a Republican who chairs the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Homeland Security, is that the heroes of Langley and the Hoover building won't share information with agencies like the INS and the Federal Aviation Administration--both vital to Ridge's mission. "The dialogue between federal agencies," says Chambliss, "is not at the level that it should be."

And the dialogue between federal and state officials? Ask Governors that question, then duck. Governor Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho says that the adjutant-general of his state National Guard is not allowed to share intelligence with him. Governor Frank Keating of Oklahoma, a former FBI agent who took part this summer in a disastrous war game of a smallpox attack, says he was "stunned" at the level of ignorance displayed by the feds about what goes on at a state and local level. And Philadelphia police chief John Timoney says, "The feds actually think that the locals, you can't trust them, they're corrupt, they'll sell information." When working with federal agencies as a senior officer in New York, he says, "there was always a sense that you were not fully briefed on everything that was going on." This isn't just whining. If homeland security has shock troops, they work for state and city governments. "The best response is local," says Keating. "You have to have doctors and nurses and emergency services and police and National Guard who are trained to respond." At present, there are huge holes in that training. Keating freely admits that "doctors and nurses in my state know nothing about anthrax and smallpox."

Can Ridge bring order to this chaos and make an anxious nation believe its government can actually stop--or at least manage--another disaster? The omens aren't good. Without operational authority, successive drug czars have found it extraordinarily difficult to get the relevant agencies to work together. Ridge has an extra problem. If counterterrorism is one of his chief missions, he will have to work closely with the armed forces. Yet not only is the military--properly--barred from performing law-enforcement duties, it also has spent little time figuring out how to discharge any new functions. "I never thought we'd see fighters over our cities defending against a threat that came from inside," Air Force General Richard Myers, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said. "This whole issue of homeland defense needs a lot more thought."

It probably does, not least by those members of the public who, in an understandable reaction to Sept. 11, are loading up on antibiotics and salves. That mood may not last. In the 1950s and '60s, the Federal Civil Defense Administration--remember duck and cover?--distributed 400 million pieces of literature to Americans. But civil defense never really caught on. By 1963, only 1 person in 50 had access to even a rudimentary shelter.

The great difference, of course, is visible in lower Manhattan; Moscow never did drop the Big One. But one day, after they've scoured the Web for a gas mask, and told one another that they're quite comfortable with the idea that airports need to look like armed camps, Americans might heed Daniel Seidemann's wise words. Seidemann is an Israeli lawyer, and hence a man for whom homeland security is an existential matter. "Society needs a balance between Athens and Sparta," he says. "If you're Athens, there's no security. If you're Sparta, you have security, but nobody wants to live there. You're talking about a balance between things that are inherently flawed." As America defends against terror, may it find a balance it can live with.

Reported by Matthew Cooper, John F. Dickerson, Viveca Novak, Mark Thompson, Karen Tumulty and Douglas Waller/Washington, Alison Jones/Durham and Timothy Roche/Atlanta

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Pg. 4

Most Experts Believe Key Reservoirs Are Safe

By Dan Vergano, USA Today

Three young men lurk outside the water plant late at night. Dressed in dark clothes, faces painted black and holding buckets of contaminants, they prepare weapons and explosives. They had scouted the plant, mapping its corridors and stealing a key. The plot: poison the water supply for the 24,000 residents of Neenah, Wis. But an engineer steps outside for a smoke, sees the intruders and ruins the plan. On that August night 3 years ago, the attackers weren't terrorists, but bored teenagers. Their poison: powdered soap.

"We really tightened up a lot after that," says engineer Larry Wettering of the Neenah Water Treatment Plant. Now, water utilities nationwide are undergoing the same security scramble and accelerating steps to protect reservoirs, dams and treatment plants from terrorists. Though none will go into details, typical steps include:

Beefed up security teams, fencing and locks. Shutting down tours and keeping large vehicles off access roads. Installing motion sensors, alarms and video cameras at key locations. Expanding emergency inlet systems to bypass contaminated water. Increased effort by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention laboratory to help reservoir operators.

In Colorado, for example, boating at a dozen government-run bodies of water is off-limits or restricted. The state's most heavily visited site, Lake Pueblo State Park outside Pueblo, is closed and blockaded.
Department of Interior facilities remain on alert after the hijackings. Metropolitan utilities in an FBI cooperative program called InfraGard received a confidential list of suspicious names to check against employee records within three days of the attacks.
Nationwide, security is up at some of the 9,300 "high hazard" dams — whose collapse would cause human deaths — and for the 3,000 metropolitan water utilities providing drinking water to 70% of the population. "These utilities are run by professionals who take their jobs very seriously," says civil engineer John McLaughlin, who heads North Carolina's Disaster Preparedness Committee.
Overall, experts such as Ken Alibek, a former Soviet bioweapons maker, dismiss waterborne bioterrorism as likely to fail if perpetrated on any well-run waterworks. For starters, truckloads of poison would be required to threaten major reservoirs that cover huge areas. Practice with hoaxes and natural disasters — such as a cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee in 1993 — has trained water works managers how to handle widespread poisonings, making bioterrorist or chemical attacks less likely to succeed, experts say.
However, vulnerabilities remain, says water pollution microbiologist Joan Rose of the University of South Florida-St. Petersburg. In perhaps the most immediately dangerous scenario, a determined saboteur who understood plumbing could "back-siphon" contaminants into the water supply of a building or neighborhood. A shift by many water systems from chlorine — shunned because of its chemical reactivity — to milder detergents might worsen such an invasion.
Destroying a dam or the pipes feeding a reservoir represents another threat. In 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers gave dam safety nationwide a "D" on its Infrastructure Report Card. Only 33% of non-federal "high hazard" dams have emergency plans, according to the Association of State Dam Safety Officials.
"We have to assure ourselves that facilities have emergency plans in place," says Diane Vande Hei, head of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies. Other priorities include continuing testing the strength of high-priority dams. In essence, water utilities will remain at "high alert" for some time, she says.
Contributing: Patrick O'Driscoll in Denver.

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U.S. Rich With Resources -- And Terror Targets

Security up at dams, chemical plants, public venues

By Fred Bayles
Now it is America the Vulnerable.
Sept. 11 proved we are not immune to foreign attack. It also illustrated how easily the nation's resources can be turned into weapons against us. Now, security officials fear other everyday tools of commerce and industry could be perverted to bring more death and destruction.
The Army Corps of Engineers stopped public tours at six hydroelectric dams on the upper Missouri River in the Dakotas. In Massachusetts, the National Guard now patrols bridges leading to Cape Cod and the massive water that supplies Boston with water. Police and private security have increased patrols in Baytown, Texas, home to a huge Exxon Mobil refinery. Amtrak now checks IDs, packages and luggage.
"We have to keep our heads on straight about what we are vulnerable to," says Bob Canfield of Los Angeles' office of emergency operations, who thinks a tractor-trailer loaded with explosives is more likely than an atomic bomb.
For years, public fears of fanatics armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons have been calmed by official explanations that they are too complex to deploy. But the hijack attacks 2 weeks ago proved that improbable scenarios can become reality.
Now come revelations that suspected hijackers were interested in crop-dusting planes capable of spraying chemicals or biological toxins and that the investigation had found people who fraudulently obtained licenses to drive hazardous-materials trucks.
With 60,000 chemical plants, the nation makes and transports tons of deadly gases and other toxins each day. A simple act of sabotage could turn a cyanide plant or a chlorine tanker into a weapon, which would make Baton

Rouge or West Virginia's Kanawha Valley synonymous with Bhopal, India, where an explosion at a Union Carbide plant killed 5,000 in 1984.
Steps to improve security at these sites languished until the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. A federal report assessing the vulnerability of chemical plants is a year overdue.
Though the corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans produces 25% of the country's industrial chemicals and 17% of its gasoline, the Louisiana Emergency Response Commission hadn't taken advantage of a federal program that would have provided $3 million in protective clothing, decontamination gear and communication equipment.
Susan Roth, a spokeswoman for the American Chemistry Council, says that member plants have increased patrols and upgraded security cameras and have even changed schedules of cleaning crews to assure that there are more supervisors to monitor the work.
Responding to federal requests, the companies are reviewing their transportation operations and paying closer attention to those who drive the trucks. Roth also says several companies have removed information on their Web sites that detail the types of chemicals and emergency plans at certain plants.
Diane Screnci, a spokeswoman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, says nuclear plants have been on heightened alert since the attacks. They have added security and reduced access to the plants, she says.
"There are specific actions that are being taken that are a sensitive nature that we can't discuss for obvious reasons," Screnci says.
Smuggling a nuclear weapon into this country poses a host of difficulties, but a trained nuclear engineer could set off a chain of events at one of the nation's 103 nuclear power plants that might rival Three Mile Island or Chernobyl.
Officials test security at these plants with mock terrorists who try to infiltrate the site. Mock terrorists succeeded at about half of the 68 plants tested over the last decade. Perhaps the scariest scenario has terrorists slipping into this country with a deadly disease that is then spread in a high-population area, killing hundreds of thousands. But terrorists don't have to smuggle. Deadly samples of plague germs or anthrax spores are available from medical supply houses, even on the Internet. Now, supply labs are stepping up scrutiny of customers. Health officials, led by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, have increased monitoring of emergency rooms. They're watching for the first symptoms of epidemic.
Surveillance also has been stepped up at potential contamination sites. Many water reservoirs are off-limits to the public.
The freedom and openness of the nation provides what military planners call "a target-rich environment" for those wanting to inflict mass casualties. Last weekend, more than 100,000 people gathered in Ann Arbor, Mich., to see Michigan play Eastern Michigan; about 40,000 crowded into Shea Stadium to watch the Mets take on the Braves. Tens of thousands packed other public venues, from concerts to shopping malls.
Security was evident everywhere. At most football stadiums, fans had to leave their backpacks and purses behind. At Minneapolis' Mall of America, the nation's largest, additional security is evident along with parking restrictions in areas adjacent to the mall.
Whether these are the first steps toward a more security-conscious society will depend on the future. Gregory Hall, chairman of the Psychology and Political Science Department at Bentley College in Massachusetts, says he believes that today's heightened concerns about national security may fade in the absence of new threats.
"As a culture, we have a resiliency that would allow us, if this turns into an isolated event, to return to a more relaxed society," he says. "But if a similar act of terrorism is replicated, you are going to see a longer culture shift on issues of safety and vigilance."

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Pg. 6

U.S. Plans Test To Detect Chemical Attack In Subway

A Washington, D.C., Metro station will be selected to test an early warning sensor to detect and identify toxic chemicals, Reuters news service reported. It quoted an unidentified official from the National Nuclear Security Administration as saying that the system, the first of its kind in the world, would be tested at one station before the end of the year. The Department of Energy has invested $ 6.45 million since 1998 in the initiative, dubbed PROTECT.